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I N T R O D U C T I O N  A N D  E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
In the eyes of the world, New York City serves as the quintessential 
emblem of the vibrant diversity within the United States and the 
gateway to the American Dream. Amid the city’s mosaic of residents 
– including African Americans, Asians, Europeans, Latinos, Middle 
Easterners and those from the Caribbean – South Asians have long 
established an indelible presence in the city. Yet, after the devastat-
ing attacks of September 11th, 2001 on the World Trade Center, 
Muslims and anyone perceived to be Muslim became the public 
enemy literally overnight. New York City soon shifted to become 
one of the epicenters of systemic racial and religious profiling 
against these communities. This occurred through arrests, ques-
tioning, surveillance, and detention. Such sanctioned discrimina-
tion carried out by law enforcement has fostered stereotypes that 
cast community members as terrorists based on religion, national 
origin, and ethnicity. Even ten years after September 11th, backlash 
continues to thrive in the form of hate crimes in neighborhoods, 
bias-based bullying of students in classrooms, and discrimination at 
the workplace.
Since September 11th, South Asian community members 
continue to encounter government scrutiny based on their race, 
national origin, and religion in various arenas. Premised on 
the faulty presumption that these communities are more prone to 
“radicalization” leading to homegrown terrorism, interrogations of 
community members and infiltration of places of worship by the 
New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) has become routine. Discriminatory airport 
screening practices by entities within the Department of homeland 
Security (DhS), including U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have 
made the phrase “flying while brown” a fixture in our lexicon. And 
the merger between national security and immigration laws, includ-
ing increasingly punitive immigration enforcement and deportation 
policies, has led to the families being torn apart.
During late 2011 and the early months of 2012, a series of reports, 
in rapid succession, came to light regarding the NYPD’s focus on 
Muslim communities. Activities included infiltration of Muslim 
student groups throughout universities in the Northeast; monitor-
ing of Shia mosques; continuous and widespread screenings during 
police trainings of the film, The Third Jihad, which proclaimed that 
Muslims want to “infiltrate and dominate” the United States; and, 
with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), spying and 
demographic mapping of Muslims in the city.i As startling as these 
revelations were, it was hardly news for many South Asians, Arabs, 
Muslims, and Sikhs in New York City. Rather, they confirmed what 
community members have already known and experienced for over 
a decade.
“Profiling” refers to the discriminatory practice by law enforce-
ment of targeting individuals for suspicion based on race, ethnic-
ity, religion, or national origin. Despite its widespread use, often 
in the name of national security, profiling does not work and 
often leads to ineffective law enforcement. It diverts limited law 
enforcement resources; in many cases, law enforcement agents miss 
actual criminal activity by focusing on racial or religious charac-
teristics. It undermines trust between targeted communities and 
the government; individuals from these communities can end up 
feeling disempowered and marginalized resulting in many becoming 
hesitant to reach out to law enforcement. It threatens community 
safety as individuals become wary about reporting criminal activity 
or cooperating in investigations. And it perpetuates public misper-
ceptions and stereotypes of targeted communities as government 
endorsement of prejudices and preconceptions can entrench these 
views among the general population.  
About In Our Own Words: Narratives of South 
Asian New Yorkers Affected by Racial and 
Religious Profiling
In order to capture the ongoing effects of profiling on the daily lives 
of South Asians in New York City, seven organizations (“New York 
City Profiling Collaborative” or the “Collaborative”) embarked 
on an initiative to document community members’ experiences.  
Members of the Collaborative included six organizations based 
in New York City that serve, organize, or advocate on behalf of 
South Asian community members, particularly in Brooklyn and 
Queens: DRUM- Desis Rising Up and Moving; The Sikh Coali-
tion; UNITED SIKhS; South Asian Youth Action (SAYA!); Coney 
Island Avenue Project (CIAP); and Council of Peoples Organization 
(COPO); and also included the national organization, South Asian 
Americans Leading Together (SAALT).ii
The Collaborative’s objectives were to understand and illuminate the 
impact of ongoing profiling by attempting to answer three primary 
questions: 
How does profiling – specifically in the contexts of law 
enforcement interactions, immigration, and airport security 
screenings – continue to affect South Asians in New York City 
over ten years after September 11th?
What are the human impacts and costs of profiling on the 
daily lives of South Asian individuals, families, and commu-
nities in New York City?  
What measures can federal, state, and local policymakers and 
stakeholders take to address and eliminate profiling?
The findings and recommendations of this report are based on 
the analysis of 628 surveys, 25 interviews, and four focus groups 
conducted with South Asian community members primarily in 
Brooklyn and Queens between August 2010 and August 2011. The 
report also draws extensively from secondary data sources. It is im-
portant to note that the documentation project does not claim to be 
a statistical analysis of profiling. Rather, the purpose was to gather 
qualitative evidence of the impact of profiling on South Asians in 
New York City, to document individual stories, and to make recom-
mendations to policymakers and stakeholders.
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Key Findings and Emerging Themes
Over the past decade, since September 11th, the stories and experi-
ences of South Asians who have faced targeting and profiling have 
permeated the national consciousness. What this documentation 
project revealed was that the impact of systemic racism in the form 
of profiling has affected “everyday people” in terms of their indi-
vidual sense of identity and their collective psyche.
Profiling has affected virtually every facet of the daily lives of com-
munity members – from how to dress, how to travel, how to prac-
tice one’s faith, how to express one’s identity, and how to interact 
with family members, neighbors, and the government. The results 
of the documentation project showed that there is a psychological 
impact that cannot be denied. Profiling has resulted in community 
members becoming second-class citizens and questioning their sense 
of belonging in the United States. Moreover, when government 
agencies couple community outreach with national security opera-
tions, it diminishes the sense of trust and safety that individuals 
feel within their own communities. As the South Asian population 
continues to grow and establish deeper roots in this country, it is 
imperative that this community is seen as part of this nation, not as 
suspects who threaten it.
Profiling has manifested itself in unique ways for various segments 
within the South Asian community. Yet, as this report shows, com-
monalities nevertheless emerge in terms of how it impacts individu-
als’ lives. The toll that profiling has taken on South Asians’ personal 
and collective sense of security and belonging were clearly conveyed 
through this documentation project, specifically, in the following 
ways:
South Asians are frequently questioned about their faith or 
national origin by government officials. Among the subset of ques-
tionnaire respondents who provided details on interactions with law 
enforcement, 73% reported being questioned about their national 
origin and 66% reported being questioned about their religious af-
filiation. Similarly, among questionnaire respondents who reported 
being subjected to additional screening at ports-of-entry, 41% 
indicated that airport CBP agents inquired about their religious or 
political beliefs.  
South Asians are often questioned by government officials about 
their immigration status which is used as leverage to pressure 
individuals to spy on fellow community members.  Among the 
subset of questionnaire respondents who provided details on interac-
tions with law enforcement, 85% reported being questioned about 
their immigration status and 42% of those interactions involved 
entities other than immigration officials. Respondents also reported 
being asked by law enforcement to report the activities of friends 
and colleagues in order to obtain immigration benefits. Such find-
ings are especially startling in light of New York City’s Executive Or-
der 41 which sets forth disclosure protections relating to individuals’ 
immigration status for city agencies, including local police.iii
South Asians subjected to profiling often sense being viewed as 
“suspects” by the general public, within their community, and 
even within their families. Whether as a result of profiling by 
airport officials, immigration authorities, or police and FBI agents, 
many respondents reported fearing nearby witnesses would subse-
quently view them with suspicion. In some instances, relationships 
with friends, colleagues, and family members became strained fol-
lowing baseless questioning.
South Asians encounter profiling so routinely that many have 
altered their behavior in an attempt to avoid additional scrutiny. 
For example, among the subset of questionnaire respondents who 
indicated the frequency at which they are subjected to secondary 
security screening by TSA agents, 25% stated being selected more 
than half the time they traveled. As a result, many respondents 
reported changing their activities, such as flying less frequently or 
removing religious attire prior to travel.
South Asians report that profiling has caused them to lose faith in 
the government’s ability to protect them in times of need. Particu-
larly among respondents who had experienced questioning or arrests 
by the NYPD or FBI, community members who reported to police 
bias or discrimination in the private sphere felt that their requests 
for help went unheeded. 
Summary of Key Recommendations
The experiences of South Asians in New York City underscore the 
need for robust anti-profiling policies at all levels of government; 
greater oversight over law enforcement agencies that have engaged in 
profiling; and increased resources to organizations assisting commu-
nities affected by profiling. While policymakers have taken certain 
steps since September 11th to mitigate profiling (such as reducing 
background-check delays for naturalization applications; modifying 
certain immigration programs that target community members; and 
undertaking reviews of biased training materials for law enforce-
ment), government agencies often institute such measures only after 
extensive advocacy efforts by community members. Moreover, such 
changes are often too late or incomplete, do not address the depth 
of community impact, or are not adequately comprehensive in 
scope.
The following is a summary of key recommendations for lawmakers, 
government agencies, and other key stakeholders. A fuller and more 
detailed set of recommendations can be found in the “Conclusions 
and Recommendations” section at the end of this report. 
Recommendations for the President, New York Governor, and 
New York City Mayor
•	 Issue and enforce executive orders prohibiting profiling and 
ban law enforcement practices that disproportionately target 
individuals for investigation and enforcement based on race, eth-
nicity, national origin, gender, or religion. These orders should 
also mandate that government agencies collect data on stops and 
searches that are disaggregated by these categories. These orders 
should also explicitly apply in the contexts of travel, surveillance, 
and immigration enforcement.
Recommendations for Congress, New York State Assembly, and 
New York City Council
•	 Introduce and pass robust anti-profiling legislation, includ-
ing those modeled after the End Racial Profiling Act, which 
would prohibit the use of profiling on the basis of race, religion, 
ethnicity, national origin, or gender by law enforcement agen-
cies; require law enforcement agencies to conduct anti-profiling 
trainings; monitor their activities with respect race and other 
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protected statuses; create effective complaint resolution process-
es; and establish a private right of action for victims of profiling 
that would allow them to seek damages in court.
•	 Hold public hearings and conduct investigations to under-
stand the effect of counterterrorism policies and profiling 
on South Asian, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. This 
includes Congressional, New York State Senate and Assembly, 
and New York City Council hearings on the use informants and 
surveillance by the FBI and NYPD; profiling in the context of 
air travel; and profiling in the context of immigration enforce-
ment. 
•	 Pass legislation that explicitly prohibits surveillance premised 
on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion by federal, state, 
and local law enforcement agencies.
•	 Strengthen government and civilian oversight over law 
enforcement agencies, including the NYPD. In addition, the 
New York City Council should create a new Inspector General’s 
office to oversee the department and an independent prosecutor 
to investigate and prosecute misconduct by the NYPD and its 
officers.
•	 Prohibit state and local law enforcement from inquiring 
about individuals’ immigration status or otherwise carry out 
immigration laws. This includes terminating federal programs, 
such as Secure Communities and 287(g), as well as similar poli-
cies instituted by state and local lawmakers.
•	 Develop strategies, in tandem with respective administrative 
agencies, to reduce over-policing and profiling in the school 
system. For example, the New York City Council should work 
with the New York City Department of Education to reduce 
the number of School Safety Agents and armed NYPD officers 
stationed in local public schools, ensuring that the NYPD meets 
its requirement of reporting arrests in schools as per the Student 
Safety Act; ends all stop and frisk activities targeting youth of 
color; and require the use of and provide funding for Positive 
Behavior Interventions Support (PBIS) programs for schools to 
address most discipline issues, including bullying and harass-
ment. 
•	 Speak out against speech and actions motivated by bias and 
hatred against communities of color. This includes xenophobic 
and racist rhetoric, discrimination, and hate crimes that occur in 
both public and private spheres.
Recommendations for Federal, State, and Local 
Government Agencies
•	 Strengthen and implement existing anti-profiling policies. 
This includes the U.S. Department of Justice amending its June 
2003 Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law 
Enforcement to include national origin and religion as bases for 
prohibiting profiling; remove the national security and border 
exceptions within the guidance; ensure its application to state 
and local law enforcement agencies; and require all federal, state, 
and local agencies to report on their compliance with the guid-
ance. In addition, New York City government agencies should 
enforce its existing anti-profiling policies. The NYPD should 
also enforce Operations Order 11 and amend its language to 
explicitly prohibit profiling on the basis of religion.
•	 Collect and publish data on the racial, ethnic, and religious 
identity of individuals with whom law enforcement inter-
actions occur. Agencies that should undertake this auditing 
effort include CBP, FBI, NYPD, and TSA. Such efforts should 
preserve the privacy of community members by collecting data 
within these categories in the aggregate and keeping identifying 
information of individuals confidential.
•	 Undertake comprehensive reviews of existing law enforce-
ment training materials and establish robust review mecha-
nisms for future trainings to ensure that speakers, films, and 
curricula used do not promote stereotypes about South Asian, 
Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities as terrorists.
•	 Reject the perpetuation of “radicalization” theories that are 
based on faulty indicators of criminal or terrorist activity and 
chill community members’ rights to freedom of religion, expres-
sion, and assembly.
•	 Mandate religious and cultural competency trainings on 
South Asian, Muslim, and Sikh communities for all officers and 
personnel but particularly those who have direct contact with 
community members. This includes proactively reaching out to 
community-based organizations with expertise on these commu-
nities for such trainings.
•	 Explicitly and repeatedly state to the public that an indi-
vidual’s race, ethnicity, or religion should not the basis for 
suspicious activity reporting programs. Such programs include 
DhS’ and New York City’s Metropolitan Transit Authority’s 
(MTA) See Something, Say Something programs. 
•	 Separate intelligence-gathering and community outreach 
strategies. Agencies that should not conflate and combine these 
engagement strategies include DhS, FBI, and NYPD.
•	 Prohibit immigration-related questioning, enforcement of 
immigration laws, and sharing of immigration-related infor-
mation by local government agencies with federal immigra-
tion authorities. Local and state law enforcement officers should 
enforce state and local criminal laws not federal civil immigra-
tion laws. Devolving immigration enforcement responsibilities, 
such as through the 287(g) or Secure Communities programs, to 
local agencies sends the improper message that immigration and 
crime, or terrorism, are inherently related.
•	 Strengthen complaint processes for individuals affected by 
profiling. This includes DhS improving transparency and pub-
licity for its Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP).
Recommendations for South Asian Community Leaders and 
Concerned Community Members
•	 Report incidents of profiling to community-based organiza-
tions committed to eliminating profiling and through govern-
ment complaint mechanisms.
•	 Host “know your rights” trainings and disseminate “know 
your rights” brochures to constituents on a regular basis.
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•	 Write letters to the editor or op-eds in media outlets that have 
previously covered stories on profiling.
•	 Build relationships and stand in solidarity with other com-
munities of color affected by profiling, including the African-
American and Latino communities.
Recommendations for Philanthropic Institutions
•	 Build capacity within South Asian communities to engage 
in community organizing, advocacy, and provide support to 
individuals affected by profiling. In order for communities to 
address the systemic nature of profiling with policymakers and 
to provide educational resources to law enforcement agencies, 
increased funding support is needed.
•	 Support future documentation efforts and statistical analysis 
of the evolving nature of profiling affecting South Asian com-
munities. As more reports of profiling emerge and the nature of 
practice has evolved, increased support is needed to capture the 
impact on community members. 
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W h O  A R E  S O U T h  A S I A N S ?
For purposes of this report, the South Asian community comprises 
of individuals who trace their ancestry to Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; in addition, 
members of Afghan and Pastun communites were surveyed in 
the documentation project as well. The community also includes 
members of the South Asian diaspora – past generations of South 
Asians who originally settled in many areas of the world, including 
the Caribbean (such as Guy-
ana, Jamaica, Suriname, and 
Trinidad & Tobago), Africa 
(including Kenya, Nigeria, 
South Africa, and Uganda), 
Canada, Europe, the Middle 
East, and other parts of Asia 
and the Pacific Islands (such as 
Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore).
The community is far from 
homogenous. South Asians 
are not only diverse in terms 
of national origin, but also in 
terms of ethnicity, religion, 
and language. South Asians 
practice various faiths, includ-
ing Buddhism, Christianity, 
hinduism, Jainism, Judaism, 
Islam, Sikhism, and Zoroastri-
anism. Among the most common languages spoken by South Asians 
are Bengali, Gujarati, hindi, Punjabi, and Urdu.
The South Asian community is one of the largest immigrant popula-
tions in New York City. According to Census 2010 data, at least 
300,000 South Asians live in the city, with Indians, Pakistanis, and 
Bangladeshis making up the most populous ethnic groups within 
the community.iv While these figures provide a baseline understand-
ing of the population, it is important to note that many South 
Asians are often undercounted in the Census, particularly within 
the non-Indian community.v This is due to various factors, includ-
ing non-Indian individuals needing to write-in their ethnicity on 
Census forms; fear among certain populations, particularly the un-
documented, of participating 
in government surveys; and 
limited English proficiency. 
As with all demographic 
statistics, these figures should 
be coupled with data from 
community-based research 
to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the com-
munity.
The New York City metro-
politan area is home to the 
largest Bangladeshi, Indian, 
Nepali, Pakistani, and Sri 
Lankan communities in the 
country.vi By far, the largest 
population of South Asians 
in New York City lives in the 
Queens followed by Brook-
lyn.vii In addition, Bangla-
deshis experienced the largest population growth between 2000 and 
2010, increasing by at least 98.8% in Brooklyn and by 109.4% in 
Queens over the past decade.viii The neighborhoods where signifi-
cant numbers of South Asians reside include Elmhurst, Flushing, 
Jackson heights, Richmond hill, and Woodside, in Queens, and 
Coney Island, in Brooklyn.
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M E T h O D O L O G Y
To ascertain the impact of profiling on South Asians in New 
York City, the Collaborative’s documentation project used three 
information-gathering methods: questionnaires; focus groups; and 
interviews. The respondent group focused on South Asians who 
had resided in New York City any time after September 11, 2001, 
with an emphasis on those in Brooklyn and Queens, where there are 
significant South Asian populations.
Questionnaires: Members of the Collaborative jointly developed 
a questionnaire asking respondents if they had experienced specific 
types of profiling during interactions with certain government enti-
ties, including: 1) federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; 
2) immigration agencies in the non-airport context; and 3) airport 
officials at both domestic and port-of-entry screening points.ix       
Respondents were encouraged to provide details about their experi-
ences in such interactions in narrative form. In addition, respon-
dents provided basic demographic information.  Although each 
respondent’s name and contact information were requested, this was 
not required in case that prevented them from participating.x 
Staff and volunteers of the Collaborative organizations administered 
questionnaires to South Asian residents in Brooklyn and Queens via 
street-side surveying; at community events or gatherings; and at or-
ganizational member meetings. The questionnaire was developed in 
English and translated into six languages: Bengali; Gujarati; hindi; 
Nepali; Punjabi (both Gurmukhi and Shahmukhi scripts); and 
Urdu. In addition, a smaller number of questionnaires were admin-
istered online through SurveyMonkey. The online questionnaires 
were available in English only. In total, 628 individuals completed 
questionnaires either online or in-person.
While every effort was made to encourage respondents to complete 
the entire questionnaire, many individuals only answered ques-
tions relevant to their personal experiences. For example, many 
Sikh respondents primarily responded to questions related to TSA. 
Similarly, many undocumented respondents who are unable to fly 
focused on questions related to profiling in the non-airport context. 
As such, this documentation project was not intended to determine 
the statistical frequency of profiling within the South Asian com-
munity nor did it attempt to make comparisons between profiling 
affecting South Asians in relation to other communities of color or 
the general public. 
Focus Groups: Collaborative members also conducted four focus 
groups on profiling within their membership and the South Asian 
community at large. Specific focus groups occurred with construc-
tion workers, musicians and artists, restaurant workers, and Afghan 
and Pashtun community members. Moderated by organizational 
staff, the focus groups sought participants’ experiences and general 
opinions about the individual and community impacts of profiling.    
Interviews: Following the questionnaires and focus groups, orga-
nizational staff and volunteers conducted 25 individual interviews 
with selected community members.  During the interviews, indi-
viduals were asked to discuss and provide additional details regard-
ing their own experiences. 
In addition to the data collected above, secondary data sources were 
reviewed and used in the development of this report.
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W h Y  P R O F I L I N G  D O E S  N O T  W O R K
Profiling is a law enforcement tactic that connects individuals to 
crimes based on characteristics unrelated to criminal conduct, such 
as race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, and perceived immigra-
tion status. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials often 
use these factors as predictors of criminal activity. historical and 
contemporary examples include the use of racial profiling when 
stopping African-American motorists, interrogating Latino travel-
ers, and, more recently, the questioning, searching, and detention of 
South Asian, Muslim, Sikh, and Arab individuals. It is clear from all 
of these experiences that profiling is flawed because it diverts limited 
law enforcement resources; undermines trust between targeted com-
munities and the government; and perpetuates public misconcep-
tions and stereotypes of affected communities.
Diverts Limited Law Enforcement Resources
Profiling is a counterproductive method of identifying criminals 
and national security threats. In many cases, law enforcement agents 
miss actual criminal activity by focusing on a race-based profile rath-
er than looking for specific behavioral indicators of illegal activity.xi 
In fact, prior to September 11th, the then-U.S. Customs Service 
eliminated the use of race, ethnicity, and gender in determining 
which passengers were subject to searches and began focusing solely 
on behavioral factors indicating suspicion.xii A subsequent study by 
Lamberth Consulting revealed that this change in policy resulted 
in an almost 300% increase in searches that actually yielded illegal 
contraband and activity.xiii
Yet many law enforcement agencies at all levels of government 
instead continue to rely upon factors, such as race, religion, ethnic-
ity, and national origin, rather than neutral indicators of suspicious 
activity. By employing such tactics, law enforcement agents are 
diverting scarce time and resources away from individuals who actu-
ally pose a threat. In the post-September 11th context, Jose Padilla, 
Richard Reid, and Colleen LaRose (also known as “Jihad Jane”), are 
all examples of individuals who do not fit the “Muslim terrorist” 
profile that law enforcement agencies have been using over the past 
ten years.
Undermines Trust Between Targeted 
Communities and Government
The effects of profiling policies are far-ranging on communities who 
are targeted by such tactics. Individuals from these communities feel 
disempowered and marginalized, and in many cases, do not trust 
government officials or law enforcement. Community members 
begin to feel wary about reporting criminal activity or seeking 
protection to due perceptions that law enforcement is biased and 
not committed to the affected community’s safety. Law enforcement 
agents find that their connections and contacts to communities be-
ing profiled are weakened.xiv  And, the rates of people of color and 
immigrants who are stopped, questioned, incarcerated, detained, 
and deported due to the use of profiling tactics begin to increase.xv
In the post-September 11th context, policies implemented in the 
name of national security have resulted in South Asian, Muslim, 
Sikh, and Arab American community members becoming hesitant 
to contact police when they feel unsafe. For example, numerous 
South Asian women’s organizations that assist community members 
facing domestic violence have reported that such policies not only 
result in an increase in abuse but have also made battered women 
afraid to call police.xvi In addition, profiling policies have raised 
suspicion within affected communities about sharing personal in-
formation with the federal government and heightened fears around 
participation in efforts intended to benefit them, such as the U.S.xvii 
Census. 
Perpetuates Public Misconceptions and 
Stereotypes of Targeted Communities
Profiling often fuels perceptions among the public at large that 
targeted community members are worthy of heightened suspicion. 
In fact, a report by SAALT compiling and analyzing incidents of xe-
nophobic rhetoric in political discourse showed at least 32 remarks 
made by elected officials and political candidates linking South 
Asians, Muslims, Sikhs, and Arabs to terrorism or supporting profil-
ing of community members between 2002 and 2010. xviii Many 
remarks in support of profiling were often based on stereotypes that 
these community members inherently pose a national security threat 
to this country.xix
Such policies and statements consequently foster an environment 
that makes it more likely that individuals from these backgrounds 
will be subjected to harassment, bullying, and discrimination, such 
as in the classroom, at work, and other public venues.xx For exam-
ple, many reports emerged immediately after September 11th, and 
still recur to this day, of South Asians, Muslims, and Sikhs being 
removed from flights, even after passing through security and board-
ing planes, due to unfounded concerns raised by crew members and 
fellow passengers.xxi
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Timeline of Selected Policies Resulting in 
Profiling of the South Asian Community in 
New York City Since September 11th
•	 September 11, 2001: In the greatest ter-
rorist attack ever executed on American 
soil, 2,606 people lost their lives in New 
York City. 
•	 September 2001: The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) created a national tip 
line where ordinary citizens call in to re-
port evidence of terrorist activity. Within 
a week of its launch, the FBI received 
tens of thousands of tips from New 
York, many based on irrational fears of 
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians.
•	 September 2001: The then-Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) is-
sued a rule allowing immigrants to be 
detained 48 hours without charge, which 
could be extended in the event of an 
“emergency.”
•	 September 2001: Chief Immigration 
Judge Michael Creppy issued a memo-
randum allowing Immigration Courts 
to close deportation proceedings for 
“special interest” detainees.
•	 September 2001 through February 
2002: Attorney General John Ashcroft 
ordered the FBI to inform the INS to 
arrest any men found in violation of 
immigration law. In all, according to 
government figures, at least 762 South 
Asian, Muslim, and Arab men – includ-
ing 491 in New York (the “New York 
Detainees”) – were arrested by the FBI 
and referred to INS for detention, based 
on their national origin and immigra-
tion status. Community organizations 
reported that actually over 1,200 men 
were rounded up in these raids. No one 
arrested as a part of these sweeps was 
ever charged with terrorist activity or 
linked to the September 11th attacks.
•	 September 2001: The FBI arrested 
individuals deemed “of interest”, even 
if suspicion was based solely on alleged 
immigration status, religious beliefs, 
ethnicity, national origin, and skin 
color. New York Detainees deemed of 
“high interest” by the FBI were held for 
further questioning at the Metropolitan 
Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn. 
Detainees were often held for lengthy 
periods of time without charge, denied 
access to attorneys or family members, 
and had daily prayers interrupted. Some 
also endured threats, racist slurs, strip 
searches, and physical abuse by MDC 
staff. Ultimately, almost all of the men 
arrested in New York were deported to 
their home countries. 
•	 October 2001: President George W. 
Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act 
into law, which increased the govern-
ment’s ability to conduct searches and 
surveillance and enhanced detention 
powers. 
•	 November 2001: Attorney General 
Ashcroft ordered “volunteer question-
ing” of over 5,000 men who came from 
countries where al-Qaeda had a “terrorist 
presence.” A second round of question-
ing began in March 2002. Of the 2,261 
men who were actually interviewed 
nationwide, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) reported that none were charged 
with crimes related to the September 
11th attacks.
•	 2002: New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) Commissioner Raymond Kelly 
established the Department’s Counter-
terrorism Bureau, the first of its kind 
in the country. It also began engaging 
in a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
partnership with the FBI.
•	 March 2002: NYPD Commissioner 
Kelly promulgated Operations Order 11, 
prohibiting racial profiling by NYPD 
officers. The order does not explicitly 
include religion within its definition of 
“racial profiling.” It does prohibit police 
officers from relying on race, ethnicity, 
religion, or national origin as a “determi-
native factor” in initiating law enforce-
ment action.
•	 April 2002: DOJ’s Office of Legal 
Counsel issued its “inherent authority” 
opinion used as a basis for allowing state 
and local law enforcement to carry out 
federal immigration laws, a practice that 
results in profiling.
•	 May 2002: Attorney General Ashcroft 
issued revised FBI investigative guide-
lines relating to domestic terrorism that 
allow agents to attend public events 
without evidence of suspicious activity; 
and diminish oversight from FBI head-
quarters over the activities of field offices 
in terrorism-related cases
•	 June 2002: DOJ rolled out the Special 
Registration program as part of the 
National Security Entry-Exit Registra-
tion System (NSEERS). Aspects of the 
program required males over the age of 
16 on non-immigrant visas and from 24 
Muslim-majority countries, including 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, (plus North 
Korea) to report to local immigration of-
fices for fingerprinting and interrogation. 
Nationwide, over 83,000 individuals 
registered of which 13,000 individuals 
were placed in deportation proceedings. 
The NSEERS program failed to identify 
any terrorism suspects or uncover any 
terrorism-related evidence. 
•	 November 2002: The Department of 
homeland Security (DhS) is formed 
with authority over both immigra-
tion and national security policy in the 
country.
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•	 December 2002: The U.S. and Canada 
signed the Safe Third Country Agree-
ment which requires most refugee claim-
ants to request protection in the first safe 
country they arrive in. As a result, many 
South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims were 
forced to turn back to the U.S. after at-
tempting to seek asylum in Canada from 
post-September 11th blanket round-ups 
in the U.S.
•	 2003: Courts loosened rules under the 
handschu Guidelines which, in 1985, 
established a three-member panel to 
oversee NYPD surveillance operations 
and allowed detectives to start an inves-
tigation only when they had “specific 
information” about a future crime. 
Under the Modified handschu Guide-
lines, NYPD intelligence authorities can 
act alone to authorize investigations for 
certain periods of time; it also lowered 
the threshold standard to merely show-
ing that the facts “reasonably indicate” 
the commission of crime.
•	 June 2003: DOJ issued its Guidance 
on the Use of Race by Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies. Its anti-profiling 
measures includes broad exceptions for 
national security and border integrity; 
fails to prohibit profiling on the basis 
of religion or national origin; does not 
apply to state or local law enforcement 
agencies; and lacks meaningful enforce-
ment mechanisms.
•	 September 2003: President Bush signed 
the homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-6 creating the Terrorist Screen-
ing Center responsible for the Terror-
ist Screening Database. The database 
included various watchlists, including 
the “no-fly list” (including names of 
passengers not allowed to board planes) 
and the “selectee list” (including names 
of passengers required to undergo ad-
ditional screening prior to boarding).
•	 Fall 2004: DhS instituted Operation 
Frontline designed to “detect, deter and 
disrupt terrorist operations” immediately 
prior to the 2004 presidential elections. 
Relying upon NSEERS databases, the 
government investigated individuals 
from primarily Muslim-majority coun-
tries.
•	 July 2004: New York City Mayor Mi-
chael Bloomberg signed legislation codi-
fying Operations Order 11, prohibiting 
racial profiling. Advocates have called for 
this law to be strengthened, specifically 
in terms of its enforcement mechanisms.
•	 July 2005: The NYPD announced it 
would commence random searches 
of bags and packages carried by indi-
viduals entering the city’s subways. This 
announcement was condemned by 
advocates as it would result in profiling.
•	 February 2006: Reports released that 
about 90% of all individuals subjected 
to NYPD’s stop-and-frisk activities were 
engaged in no unlawful activity what-
soever, and nearly 86% of all persons 
stopped were African-American or 
Latino.
•	 May 2006: An internal NYPD intel-
ligence strategy report was issued to 
Commissioner Kelly calling for targeted 
surveillance of Shia Muslims and their 
mosques in New York, New Jersey, 
and Connecticut based solely on their 
religion. These secret documents become 
public through the Associated Press (AP) 
in January 2012.
•	 February 2007: DhS instituted the 
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
(TRIP) intended to allow travelers to 
submit complaints with watchlists and 
heightened screening. Yet many indi-
viduals reported that the program failed 
to provide any meaningful recourse.
•	 August 2007: The NYPD released the 
report “Radicalization in the West: The 
homegrown Threat,” asserting that radi-
calization is widespread among Muslims 
in New York and that law enforcement 
must mobilize to combat it. The report 
was heavily criticized for its failure to 
provide any evidence of increasing radi-
calization while it listed benign behav-
iors, such as engaging in group outdoor 
activities and giving up smoking, as 
evidence of the phenomenon. 
•	 August 2007: The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) issued 
guidelines stating that Sikh turbans 
and Muslim headscarves should be 
subjected to additional screening. In 
October 2007, such searches were no 
longer mandatory under TSA’s “bulky 
clothing” policy, but instead left it to 
the discretion of screeners; passengers 
were also offered additional screening 
options providing increased privacy. Sikh 
and Muslim community members still 
continued to frequently be pulled out for 
security screening because of their attire.
•	 July 2008: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) was given greater au-
thority to search and seize the belongings 
of passengers entering the United States, 
even absent evidence that an individual 
poses a threat.
•	 December 2008: DOJ issued the FBI’s 
Domestic Investigative Operative Guide 
(DIOG) that relaxed restrictions on 
federal law enforcement to conduct 
threat assessments using factors based on 
religion and ethnicity. It also lowered the 
threshold to commence threat assess-
ments without requiring an adequate 
factual basis or supervisory approval for 
national security cases.
•	 January 2010: TSA began requir-
ing U.S.-bound passengers who were 
nationals of or travelling from/through 
14 Muslim-majority countries, includ-
ing Pakistan, (plus Cuba) to receive 
full body pat-downs and searches of all 
carry-on items. This policy was rescinded 
in April 2010 and replaced with a “real-
time threat-based” screening system.
•	 July-September 2010:  Debate across 
the country focused on the proposed 
construction of the Park51 Muslim 
community center in Lower Manhattan. 
Numerous elected officials and political 
candidates made statements opposing 
the establishment of Park51 because of 
a Muslim center’s perceived proximity 
to Ground Zero. Within this climate, 
several hate crimes occurred, including 
the vicious assault of a Bangladeshi taxi-
cab driver in New York, Ahmed Sharif, 
whose attacker was a passenger who 
asked if Sharif was Muslim.
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•	 October 2010: Following the initial 
roll-out of new Advanced Imaging Tech-
nology (AIT) machines in airports across 
the country, DhS and TSA informed 
Sikh advocacy groups that turbaned Sikh 
travelers at U.S. airports should always 
expect to undergo secondary screening 
in the form of a turban pat-down and/
or a metallic detector wand over the 
turban.
•	 October-December 2010: The NYPD 
screened the film The Third Jihad to its 
Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, and 
Radiological (COBRA) Unit, which 
provides terrorism awareness training 
for patrol forces. Screened before 1,500 
officers, the film included numerous 
Islamophobic messages, including that 
Muslims aim to “infiltrate and domi-
nate” the United States. NYPD Com-
missioner Kelly also played a role in its 
production, including being interviewed 
for the film. News about the film’s use 
came to light in 2011, after which Kelly 
initially denied involvement with the 
film and minimized its widespread use 
during police trainings.
•	 January 2011: New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo issued a letter to DhS 
indicating that the state would be sus-
pending its participation in Secure Com-
munities, a program where participating 
jails submit arrestees’ fingerprints to the 
FBI and immigration databases, allowing 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) access to information on individu-
als held in jails. Concerns remain as 
DhS has since asserted that states and 
municipalities will be unable to elect out 
of the initiative.
•	 March 2011: Peter King, a Congres-
sional representative from Long Island 
and chair of the house Committee 
on homeland Security, commenced a 
series of Congressional hearings focused 
on radicalization within the Muslim 
community. In New York City, as well 
as elsewhere in the country, community 
members mobilized to raise concerns 
regarding the hearings’ exclusive focus 
on the Muslim community.
•	 April 2011: DhS announced modifica-
tions to NSEERS, specifically “delisting” 
the list of countries whose nationals were 
subject to registration requirements. 
Despite the announcement, individuals 
remain affected by adverse immigration 
consequences as a result of the program 
and the program’s underlying regulatory 
framework also remains intact.
•	 April 2011: The New York State Senate’s 
Committee on Veterans, homeland 
Security, and Military Affairs convened 
a hearing on national security issues, 
which included topics such as “the cul-
ture of jihad” and “Sharia law.”
•	 August 2011: An AP investigation 
revealed that the NYPD developed pro-
grams, with the assistance of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), using infor-
mants, known as “mosque crawlers,”  to 
spy on communities often absent any 
evidence of wrongdoing; and engaged 
in surveillance of neighborhoods, 
often solely on the basis of religion or 
ethnicity.
•	 November 2011: The U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
issued a policy memorandum with direc-
tions to “refer all cases in which an appli-
cation is denied based on an NSEERS 
violation to ICE for possible Notice 
to Appear (NTA) issuance.” NTAs are 
charging documents that initiate depor-
tation proceedings.
•	 November 2011:  The New York City 
Department of Education released its 
first public data in compliance with the 
Student Safety Act reporting 73,441 
suspensions in schools, an increase from 
21,396 in 2002.  Community groups 
site the parallel 65% increase in New 
York City’s budget for police (including 
200 armed NYPD officers and 5,200 
School Safety Agents) and security 
equipment in schools (metal detectors 
and scanners) since 2002.
•	 February 2012: The AP published its 
investigative report on NYPD officers 
infiltrating Muslim Student Associations 
at universities throughout the north-
eastern U.S. Another AP investigation 
revealed that the NYPD has been build-
ing secret files on mosques outside of its 
jurisdiction in New York City, including 
in New Jersey and New York’s Suffolk 
and Nassau Counties. Police also pho-
tographed and mapped mosques, listing 
them as “Islamic Religious Institutions.”
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T O  P R O T E C T  A N D  S E R V E  …
O R  S U S P E C T  A N D  O B S E R V E ?
As the thoughts of New Yorkers moved past bombing plots and 
anthrax attacks after September 11th, the focus of various law 
enforcement agencies shifted to South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims 
in the city. Entities such as the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began to aggressively monitor and 
interrogate community members. Students also reported enduring 
similar treatment by School Safety Agents stationed in local high 
schools. Often, during interactions with law enforcement, com-
munity members recounted being stopped and searched on pretense 
and being questioned about their immigration status, national 
origin, religious affiliation, or political beliefs.
Setting the Stage for 
Profiling of South 
Asians and Muslims 
in New York City by 
Law Enforcement
In the immediate aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks, the 
NYPD began quietly con-
structing one of the largest 
anti-terrorism apparatuses in 
the world, focusing its efforts 
through profiling the Muslim 
community in New York City. 
In 2002, NYPD Commission-
er Raymond Kelly established 
its Counterterrorism Bureau 
and also engaged in a Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
partnership with the FBI.xxii 
In August 2007, the NYPD 
released a report entitled 
“Radicalization in the West: 
The homegrown Threat” in 
which it argued that wide-
spread radicalization among 
Muslims in New York and 
the rest of the country was 
a real phenomenon that law 
enforcement must mobilize to 
combat it.xxiii however, there 
was no evidence in the report 
to backup the NYPD’s assertion of broadly accepted radicalization 
in the Muslim community. Perhaps the most dubious portion of the 
report was the list of benign behaviors, such as engaging in group 
outdoor activities and giving up smoking, as evidence of radicaliza-
tion. In response to widespread opposition by community members, 
advocates, and experts alikexxiv, the NYPD amended the report to 
add a statement of clarificationxxv ; yet, it is clear that the NYPD 
continues to employ tactics that explicitly focus on Muslim com-
munities.  
Most recently, as revealed by a series of Associated Press (AP) 
investigations, the NYPD has surreptitiously sent plainclothes of-
ficers – known as “rakers” – into Muslim and Arab neighborhoods 
to monitor the daily life of community members at bookstores, 
cafes, restaurants, and places of worship.xxvi Even absent evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing or potential terrorist activity, officers gathered 
meticulous notes on eavesdropped conversations and innocuous 
activities as well as photographed locations where community mem-
bers congregated.xxvii This information became the building blocks 
for a massive ethnic mapping database of where Muslims went 
“grocery shopping, ate dinner, and prayed.”xxviii
According to interviews with 
the NYPD by the AP, for 
example, “the department 
sought a rundown from the 
taxi commission of every 
Pakistani cab driver in the 
city, and produced an analyti-
cal report on every mosque 
within 100 miles.” xxix Then, 
after sending increasing 
numbers of police officers to 
Pakistani neighborhoods,  law 
enforcement was “instructed 
… to look for reasons to stop 
cars: speeding, broken tail 
lights, running stop signs. 
The traffic stop gave police 
an opportunity to search for 
outstanding warrants or look 
for suspicious behavior. An 
arrest could be the leverage 
the police needed to per-
suade someone to become an 
informant.”xxx These infor-
mants, who often faced no 
choice but to become the eyes 
and ears of the government, 
as well as undercover officers 
then infiltrated dozens of 
mosques and Muslim student 
groups in the city.xxxi
In early 2012, more reports 
unveiled the extensive nature 
of the NYPD’s focus on Muslim communities. Activities included 
infiltration of Muslim student groups throughout universities in 
the Northeast; monitoring of Shia mosques; and continuous and 
widespread screenings during police trainings of the film, The Third 
Jihad, which proclaimed that Muslims want to “infiltrate and domi-
nate” the United States.xxxii
Further fomenting distrust of law enforcement was the rollout of 
the Secure Communities program by ICE, a fingerprint sharing 
program among local police, FBI, and immigration authorities. 
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Nationwide, this program has raised concerns as it essentially grants 
enforcement of federal immigration laws to local and state police 
and makes community members hesitant to contact authorities 
when in need of assistance out of fear of potential negative immi-
gration consequences.xxxiii In January 2011, New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo issued a letter to the Department of homeland 
Security (DhS) stating that the state would be suspending its 
participation in the programxxxiv, but concerns remain as DhS has 
since asserted that states and municipalities will be unable to elect 
out of the initiative.xxxv
South Asians Report Being Stopped by Law 
Enforcement Without Cause
With such policies and programs set into motion by the NYPD, 
along with the FBI and DhS, it is no surprise that respondents who 
participated in the Collaborative’s documentation project reported 
experiencing profiling by these agencies. Specifically, many respon-
dents reported often being stopped by law enforcement for no 
apparent reason other than their national origin or religion. Among 
those who participated in the questionnaire, 115 individuals report-
ed interactions with the NYPD, 96 individuals reported interactions 
with ICE, and 40 individuals reported interactions with the FBI. 
[A]fter September 11th, I was on the Brooklyn Bridge 
with passengers and the police pulled me over. [They] 
asked me why I [was] there and I told them it was 
because I had passengers. [T]hey asked to see my license 
and registration, then they let me go. Out of the people 
on the bridge, why would they stop me and ask me why 
I’m there? This is my job but they still harassed me. 
– Bangladeshi Muslim male taxi driver, Sunnyside, Queens
I was stopped by the NYPD. [T]hey searched me and they never had 
a warrant. They questioned my friends and [me]: “What is your 
name and age?” They would ask us why we were [t]here. And, we 
[said], “We’re waiting for someone.” 
– 17-year-old Bangladeshi Muslim male high school student, 
Jackson heights, Queens
I work [for] construction companies as a day laborer. I 
was questioned by ICE and NYPD several times, while 
waiting to be hired at the corner of the street, because of 
my appearance. 
– South Asian restaurant worker focus group participant
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I was contacted with regard to my ex-husband. They wanted to 
know if [he] had any ties with terrorists or engaged in any terrorist-
type trainings. They asked about my marriage, the reason for [the] 
divorce, and whether I still maintain contact with him. They asked 
to meet a couple of weeks later, where they showed me pictures and 
asked if I had seen any of these pictured men associating with my 
ex-husband. 
– 34-year-old Pakistani Muslim female social worker, howard 
Beach, Queens
A year ago, [the] FBI called me from a mobile [phone], 
asked my name and told me “we want to see you.” Two 
FBI agents came to my house. They would frequently 
come and make false statements and ask me a lot of 
questions and also threaten that I cannot leave New York 
City. They told me that they are following me 24/7. They 
took my passport and green card and then returned it 
later. Again they reminded me that they are following 
me. 
– 29-year-old Bangladeshi Muslim male restaurant worker, 
Woodside, Queens 
These narratives show that community members have been stopped 
and suspected by law enforcement as part of their daily lives and 
even absent evidence of any criminal activity.
South Asians Report Being Questioned About 
their Faith, National Origin, and Immigration 
Status
Among the subset of respondents who provided further details on 
their interactions with law enforcement, 85% reported being ques-
tioned about their immigration status and 42% of these interactions 
involved entities other than ICE. In addition, among these same 
respondents, 73% reported that they were questioned about their 
national origin by law enforcement agents and 66% reported being 
questioned about their religious affiliation.  
In mid-January 2011, a 25-year-old man was looking for parking. 
There was a police car double-parked across the street. [The man] 
just happened to find a spot empty and parked his car to go and 
pray Jummah [Friday prayer]. The police car across the street made 
a U-turn and the officers came out to question him as he was getting 
out [of ] the car. They asked him why he parked his car there when 
there were other available parking spots. He was laughing when he 
told them that he just found a parking spot and parked there; there 
was no specific reason. The officers tried to ask other questions like, 
“Are you Muslim? Where are you from? Do you often pray at this 
mosque?” But he simply said “Why does all this matter? Did I do 
something wrong? Please tell me.” The officers told him he did noth-
ing wrong. The Muslim man then said “I am sorry but I have to go 
and pray” and left without answering the questions. 
– Summary of interview with a South Asian respondent in 
Brooklyn
I was stopped by an FBI agent while I was coming back 
from work in the evening. He asked me to show my 
ID. He asked me questions like which masjid [mosque] 
I go to pray and [if ] I know any terrorists in my 
neighborhood. I said to him, “No, I don’t.” 
– South Asian construction worker focus group participant
I recall when FBI and DHS agents had surrounded our neighbor-
hood in Brooklyn. They would wait for the restaurant workers to 
show up at work. My colleagues in the restaurant kitchen were often 
questioned by [these] agencies. They were asked about their religion 
and their affiliation with terrorist organizations that we never heard 
[of ] before. They also asked about immigration status, ethnicity, 
and so on. 
– 68-year-old South Asian restaurant worker focus group partici-
pant
Yeah, I’ve been asked [by NYPD] about where I’m from, 
and my religious beliefs. I guess you can say that they 
didn’t look down at me, but they weren’t so happy about 
where I was or who I am.
 – 18-year-old Bangladeshi Buddhist high school student, 
Jackson heights, Queens
[While] hanging out with friends in Elmhurst - cops stopped and 
asked if we were Bangladeshi or if we had drugs.
- 26-year-old Indian hindu male, Elmhurst, Queens
Such questioning raises concerns about how community members’ 
safety and trust in local police can be compromised when they 
are viewed differently by law enforcement based on their religion, 
national origin, or immigration status.
South Asians Report Being Approached by Law 
Enforcement to Spy on Their Own Communities
Often, individuals who were stopped and questioned by law 
enforcement were then asked by the very same agents to spy on 
their own communities in order to obtain supposed counterter-
rorism intelligence. At times, community members were promised 
immigration benefits if they complied or face adverse immigration 
consequences if they did not.
In 2002, I was arrested when I came back from work 
by FBI and ICE. I went through hell with five nights 
of questioning. They asked me about my [religious] 
affiliation or knowledge of terrorism. They asked me 
if I [had] any knowledge of [the] planning [for] the 
September 11th attacks. I had no clue why they were 
asking me these questions. When I refused to spy on my 
community and falsely trap them, I was locked up in a 
detention center for six months. 
– 60-year-old Pakistani restaurant worker focus group 
participant
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[An FBI agent] offered me immigration benefits such as a green card 
and asked me to cooperate with him. I was trembling with fear and 
could not speak well. He let me go by saying that he will come back 
again and that I should think about it.
– South Asian construction worker focus group participant
I was questioned by FBI agents and [the] NYPD to identify people 
in my community who are involved in terrorism. I have been 
questioned six times since September 11th. Every time I responded 
in [the] negative and said that we are mostly working class people 
who work 70-80 hours per week to survive. Our only crime is that 
we are Pashtuns.
 – 55-year-old Afghan/Pashtun focus group participant
These stories show that law enforcement often leverages individuals 
own relationships within their communities against them – which 
can foment mistrust within their own personal circles.
South Asians Report Interactions with Law 
Enforcement Harm Relationships with 
Government, Friends, and Family Members
Various respondents indicated that the effect of such monitoring 
and questioning sowed distrust of law enforcement and caused them 
to lose faith in turning to police for assistance during times of need. 
In addition, several respondents stated that such treatment unfairly 
branded them as criminals even within the eyes of their own fami-
lies and communities.
I felt like I was being threatened more than just being 
questioned. While it was happening, I was just always 
scared of the outcome, like, would I go with them and 
sit in [the] back of the car in handcuffs? For whatever 
reason, that would also be a scare for me. It would go up 
on my record and I’m trying to get a job. They are gonna 
see my record and then they are gonna be, like, you 
have been arrested for what reason? And, also, socially, 
find out, like – hey, yeah, my son got arrested this many 
nights. It’s not really a proud thing for your parents to 
tell other people, so it has affected my family and my 
education as well.
– 18-year-old Bangladeshi Buddhist high school student, 
Jackson heights, Queens
My son was arrested in August 2004. Since then, we have been 
getting these calls and anti-Muslim hate letters [at] my husband’s 
store. I did complain to the police about this, and I still do have the 
complaint number, but nothing was done about this. After all this 
happened with my son, I was so worried, paranoid, and stressed. I 
didn’t know why it was happening to my family and [me]. 
– Pakistani Muslim female homemaker, Jackson heights, 
Queens
I was arrested by a School Safety Agent in Flushing, Queens, in 
2009. I was searched … [and] questioned. My friend was present 
with me from school. The tone of the conversation was aggressive 
and hostile. I was scared … and I thought, I am gonna get arrested. 
[A]ll of [this] affected my school work, family life, and relationship 
with my friend. So, now, whenever I get stopped by cops, they’ll no-
tice [the arrest] after they run my name. Also, my friend and family 
don’t talk to me anymore. My family thinks I am a criminal. I told 
my family members about this incident, but they take the [govern-
ment’s] word over mine, so they don’t believe or trust me. It [also] 
impacted my school life because I failed that marking period. 
– 18-year-old Indian hindu male high school student, Jackson 
heights, Queens
At a movie theater in Kew Gardens, my friends and I 
went to see Iron Man 2 on a Friday evening. There was 
a couple who started calling us names referring to my 
turban, like “Osama bin Laden – I wouldn’t want to 
mess with you. God knows what you be hiding in that 
s—t.” The staff of that cinema not only noted what 
he said but contacted the NYPD and said there was a 
possible terror alert. We were escorted out and detained 
by 12 cops and three undercover detectives. 
– 23-year-old Sikh security agent, South Ozone Park, Queens
These narratives made clear that the suspicion of community 
members, often perpetuated by law enforcement’s interactions with 
them, has struck deep within their own personal lives and the rami-
fications have extended to their friends, families, and classmates.
Recommendations
Given the pernicious impact that profiling, particularly on the 
part of the FBI and NYPD, has had on South Asians in their daily 
lives, it is crucial that systemic measures are undertaken to curb the 
practice, as outlined in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” 
section of this report. In addition to the broader anti-profiling 
policies that are needed from Congress; specific reforms should be 
undertaken by the FBI, DhS, New York City Council, and NYPD. 
Beyond strengthening existing anti-profiling measures, it is impera-
tive that community engagement and intelligence-gathering opera-
tions by law enforcement are clearly demarcated and kept distinct. 
Furthermore, greater oversight and transparency over how such 
activities are conducted is needed. 
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I M M I G R A N T S  A S  “ E N E M I E S ”
Perhaps the most iconic landmark of the United States is the Statue 
of Liberty – a welcoming beacon to our shores for many across the 
world. Yet, after September 11th, immigrants of all backgrounds 
were turned away and ferreted out by the government as never be-
fore. In 2002, the government signaled its approach of equating im-
migration enforcement with counterterrorism by charging the newly 
created agency, the Department of homeland Security (DhS), with 
authority over both arenas of policy. In the ensuing decade, these 
federal policies have wreaked havoc for local communities in New 
York City.
NSEERS: Profiling Meets 
Immigration and National 
Security
One telling example of how South Asian 
communities have been affected by 
post-September 11th immigration poli-
cies is the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS) program, 
established in late 2002. Under one com-
ponent of the program, known as Call-in 
Special Registration, non-citizen, non-immigrant, men and boys 
above the age of 16 from 25 Muslim-majority nations, including 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as North Korea, were required to 
report to local immigration offices between November 2002 and 
April 2003.xxxvi
The government did little to publicize the initiative, leaving many 
individuals, who were mandated to comply, completely unaware of 
its requirements.xxxvii Notices posted to announce the program pro-
vided only the most basic information. As a result, the vast majority 
of individuals did not even hear about the program from the gov-
ernment and most became aware only through family and friends.  
For those who did comply, many did so voluntarily because they did 
not want to violate the law or had heard widespread rumors that it 
was a way to legalize their immigration status. 
I am legally blind. I lost my vision in an accident about 
thirty years ago. I came here originally for treatment. 
I used to work in a restaurant. After September 11th, 
all male members of our community were required 
to comply with special registration. We were told by a 
DHS agent in our local masjid [mosque] that those who 
register with immigration shall be granted legal status. 
I, along with thousands of others, was trapped by this 
deception and [was] put [into] deportation.  
– Participant in restaurant worker focus group
In New York City, community members were asked to report to 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) offices at 26 Fed-
eral Plaza in Lower Manhattan.xxxviii There was no clear guidance 
on what legal rights individuals would have, whether they could 
bring an attorney with them, or what the repercussions of report-
ing would be. Scenes at 26 Federal Plaza were surreal with lines of 
Muslim men streaming outside the building, waiting to be finger-
printed, photographed, and interviewed. Every morning, by 9:00 
a.m., during the reporting period, the line would stretch for blocks 
outside the building; it was not uncommon to have to wait two or 
more hours in the cold.xxxix Once they arrived at the entrance and 
entered the building, the men were ushered to the third floor for 
check-in using their passport and I-94 form, indicating proper entry 
into the United States.xl Upon check-in, each registrant was given 
a form to provide biographical information.xli Registrants would 
then wait another hour or more until their 
numbers were called to go through the 
registration process.xlii Part of this process 
included being questioned under oath 
about immigration status, employment 
status, political opinions, and religious 
beliefs.xliii Some were subsequently made 
to turn over their belongings, subjected to 
searches, and put through more intensive 
questioning.xliv
For some, this would be the end of the 
process and they would return home; 
but for other individuals, the ordeal would continue.xlv Eventually, 
immigration enforcement officers would bring them to the tenth 
floor where they would be asked to turn over their belongings, 
remove their belts and empty their pockets, and subsequently be 
searched.xlvi Registrants were often required to remain on the tenth 
floor until the next morning or afternoon until they were called for 
further, more intensive questioning.xlvii Since eating or drinking was 
not permitted, and the cafeteria closed at 3:30 p.m. each day, many 
went almost full days without nourishment.xlviii
South Asians Report Personal Distress Resulting 
from NSEERS Remains
The most severe impact of NSEERS remains with the over 13,000 
individuals who were placed in deportation proceedings, including 
many with pending immigration applications. The aftermath was 
thousands of families being broken up and communities devastated 
by the separation. And, despite the fact that the NSEERS program 
was initiated ten years ago, to this day, respondents continue to 
recall the stress and fear that resulted.
I can never forget two nights [on] the tenth floor of Federal Plaza 
where I was detained, when I went to comply with special registra-
tion. I was not given any food [for] two days and was interrogated 
for terrorism. It was inhuman behavior towards Muslims and 
Pakistanis in general. 
– Participant in South Asian construction worker focus group
I am [a] witness to the draconian special registration 
program. In 2003, when I went to Federal Plaza for this 
program, my wife was pregnant with my daughter. It 
is so painful to recall that when I did not return home 
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until midnight, my wife [and] my two minor sons [were] 
pacing outside the federal building. They had no clue 
whether I was alive or not. 
– Participant in Pashtun and Afghan focus group
In 2002, after the introduction of NSEERS, seven musicians and 
singers were arrested when they went to comply with special regis-
tration. Everybody, regardless of their age [or] gender was scared, 
especially the community of musicians who always promote love and 
peace through music. We have never been exposed to such heavy state 
oppression. 
– Participant in musician focus group
South Asians Report Continuing to Encounter 
Adverse Immigration Consequences Resulting 
from NSEERS
Of the over 83,000 individuals who registered through the program 
nationwide, nearly 13,000 were issued Notices to Appear (NTAs), a 
document that triggers deportation/removal proceedings in immi-
gration court.xlix Modifications were made to the program in 2003 
as well is in 2011l, yet individuals continue to face negative immi-
gration consequences as a result. Most recently, in November 2011, 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a 
policy memorandum with directions to “refer all cases in which an 
application is denied based on an NSEERS violation to ICE [Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement] for possible NTA issuance.”li As 
with other sweeps in 2001, the NSEERS program failed to identify 
any terrorism suspects or uncover any terrorism-related evidence.lii
My friend did not register and was denied a work permit. He has 
four kids and was even laid off from his job. He does not have any 
documents currently and is working very hard to support and feed 
his family. 
– 41-year-old Muslim Bangladeshi male hotel worker, Queens 
Village, Queens
I know a family that left New York City for Canada in 
fear [after] September 11th because they did not have 
status. After leaving, they were deported from Canada 
and entered the United States. [They are] in deportation 
proceedings [and] the husband spent nine months in a 
detention center.
 – 45-year-old Muslim Bangladeshi male sales worker, Jamaica, 
Queens
As illustrated by respondents, the memories of NSEERS remain 
fresh in community members’ minds and many are still grappling 
with the destruction of families and communities as well as ongoing 
immigration consequences that may still lead to deportation.
Recommendations
While it should be acknowledged that DhS has modified the pro-
gram by “delisting” the list of countries whose nationals were subject 
to registration requirements in April 2011, the program’s regulatory 
framework still remains on the books. In addition, for community 
members placed in deportation/removal proceedings or encoun-
tering challenges in obtaining immigration benefits as result of 
NSEERS, particularly in light of the November 2011 policy memo-
randum from USCIS, individuals’ situations have not improved. It 
also remains unclear whether and how personal data of community 
members obtained through NSEERS is being retained or used by 
government agencies. As outlined in the “Conclusions and Recom-
mendations” section of this report, DhS must take measures to 
completely terminate the program and resolve its ongoing effects.
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F L Y I N G  W h I L E  B R O W N
The experiences of all Americans traveling by air were altered dra-
matically by September 11th. More intense security measures have 
been instituted by government officials – whether it is removing 
jackets and shoes at screening checkpoints, allowing only ticketed 
passengers at flight gates, or placing a limited amount of liquid 
and gels into separate plastic bags in carry-on luggage. For South 
Asian, Muslim, Sikh, and Arab travelers, however, various changes 
in security procedures, carried out by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) within the Department of homeland Security (DhS), have 
had a unique and discriminatory impact. Policies and practices have 
resulted in selective treatment of travelers from these communities, 
such as additional screening because of religious attire and being 
asked personal questions related to faith and political beliefs. The 
impact has been far more than mere inconvenience. Rather, visible 
mistreatment based on profiling further raises sentiments of suspi-
cion against community members by the mainstream public and 
forces individuals to question whether they are afforded the same 
rights as other Americans.  
Faith and Flying: Profiling of South Asians at 
Ports of Entry
South Asians frequently encounter additional searches and question-
ing by CBP officials at U.S. ports of entry upon returning from 
trips abroad.  Under current policies, CBP uses a two-track system 
for screening persons entering the country – one for American 
citizens and another for non-citizens.liii On either of these tracks, 
CBP agents may select a traveler for a secondary enhanced screening 
that can include an intrusive body and baggage searches, extensive 
questioning, and detention.liv South Asian travelers returning to or 
entering the U.S. for the first time have been targeted for detailed 
interrogation about political views, family, friends, financial transac-
tions and religious beliefs.lv Their cell phones, computers, personal 
papers, business cards and books are searched and copied with 
virtually no evidence that an individual poses a threat; and they are 
often subjected to prolonged detention and referral to immigration 
authorities.  Part of the reason why this occurs is the result of a 2008 
guidance issued by CBP which states that “in the course of a border 
search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and 
analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to 
enter, reenter, depart, pass through, or reside in the U.S.”lvii In ad-
dition, the year prior to the issuance of this guidance, CBP lowered 
the threshold for invading passengers’ privacy from a “probable 
cause” to a “reasonable suspicion” standard.lviii
South Asians Report Being Questioned 
Regarding Religious Practices at Ports of Entry
According to questionnaire results, 34% of respondents who 
indicated that they had been subject to additional questioning by 
government officials stated that they had been isolated by agents 
for this purpose. Among the same respondents who were made to 
undergo such questioning, 41% stated that CBP agents questioned 
them about their religious or political beliefs.  
A Pakistani man in his mid-40s was traveling back 
from Pakistan in August 2009, along with his 17-year-
old daughter and 16-year-old son. At JFK [airport], 
almost half of the passengers of the same flight were 
separated for questioning. His family was separated and 
were [told to keep] moving from one room to another. 
His daughter was very scared because this was her first 
time in America and was separated from both her male 
[guardians]. At the end, in the third room [that they 
were made to go into], one [agent] asked him about 
how long he stayed in Pakistan and what he was doing 
in New York City. [The agent] asked his son about his 
schooling. The questions asked were … in a probing 
tone. It took six hours. They did not understand why they 
were separated and questioned for so long. [They were not 
given] an explanation when they were finally allowed 
to leave. 
– Summary of a Pakistani respondent interview
In 2008, a Bengali woman was coming from Bangladesh to Ameri-
ca for the first time. She went through the first stage of security, and, 
then, she was asked for additional screening. There was a female of-
ficer present at the front, but this officer stayed … at the front when 
the passenger was told to go to a separate room. There were two men 
who patted her down and spoke only English. She didn’t understand 
what they were saying and assumed that the men were the only ones 
allowed to check her for security reasons. The officers did not ask the 
female officer to help them with the pat down and, therefore, did not 
give the Bengali woman the respect and courtesy deserved. 
– Summary of Bangladeshi respondent interview
In mid-March 2008, a 23-year-old Muslim woman was traveling 
with her 2-year-old son from Canada to New York at La Guardia 
airport. She went through the regular screening with her son, but, 
then, was asked to step aside for further security purposes. She was 
the only one asked to step aside [from those in] line. She was wear-
ing a hijab and was questioned about what was underneath it. The 
immigration officers led her and her child to a different room where 
she and her son were both patted down. Her luggage was also opened 
and checked. After the officer found nothing, the woman was told to 
wait for another officer to call her because she had to be questioned. 
The other officer rudely asked her questions like, “Where are you 
originally from? Why are you traveling with a child and whose child 
is he? Why didn’t you change your maiden name after marriage? 
Why do you travel so much? Where is your husband? What does he 
do? What is his status? Has he ever been arrested?”
 – Summary of respondent interview
Through these stories, community members conveyed that they 
were being singled out by immigration officials at airports because 
of their faith, ethnic background, or specific countries that they 
were traveling from.
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Faith and Flying: Profiling of South Asians in 
Domestic Travel
In addition to security screening procedures targeting individuals 
upon return from travel abroad, even domestically, South Asians 
have also endured heightened scrutiny by TSA agents. Airport 
screening procedures were altered soon after September 11th that 
resulted in the targeting of many Sikh and Muslim travelers. As a re-
sult, TSA put into place an investigative mechanism in the months 
after September 11th to enable travelers to report incidents of bias 
during air travel. Following advocacy from Sikh, Muslim, South 
Asian, and Arab American organiza-
tions, TSA also issued directives that 
described methods for conducting 
airport screening in a manner that 
ensures safety and protects civil rights. 
however, in August 2007, TSA issued 
a set of guidelines governing domestic 
airport screening procedures mandat-
ing that travelers wearing turbans and 
headscarves be subjected to additional 
screening.lix A revised October 2007 
“bulky clothing” screening procedure 
was subsequently implemented that 
no longer required that turbans and 
hijabs be automatically searched for 
non-metallic threats; rather, it was left 
to an individual TSA officer’s discretion 
if they believed the head covering was 
bulky and eligible for further screen-
ing.lx It also required a TSA officer to 
provide the choice of a private turban 
screening or use of a puffer machine, 
a self pat-down and test for chemical 
traces through a finger swab, or a pat 
down of the turban by a TSA officer.
lxi Then, in October 2010, following 
the initial roll-out of new Advanced 
Imaging Technology (AIT) machines in 
airports across the country, DhS and 
TSA informed Sikh advocacy groups that turbaned Sikh travelers at 
U.S. airports should always expect to undergo secondary screening 
in the form of a turban pat-down and/or a metallic detector wand 
over the turban.lxii
South Asians Report Additional Screening 
Triggered By Religious Attire
Questionnaire respondents revealed that additional screening has, 
unfortunately, become the norm for many travelers because of 
their religious attire. In fact, among the subset of respondents who 
indicated the frequency at which they get subjected to secondary 
security screening by TSA agents, 25% stated they were selected 
more than half of the time that they traveled.
I was asked to go through secondary screening. I asked why and [the 
agents] said it was because of my turban. 
– 32-year-old male Sikh software manager, JFK Airport
I was at the airport and they checked my luggage and searched me. I 
was covered from head to toe wearing my Islamic dress. 
– 56-year-old Pakistani Muslim female, Coney Island, Brooklyn
I was traveling with my son – only two-and-half years old – and 
[the agents] fully searched him and myself at the airport in March 
2007. I believe[it was] just because I was wearing a hijab [that] 
they searched me and my belongings. 
– 25-year-old Pakistani Muslim female administrative assistant, 
Bensonhurst, Brooklyn
It’s more often than not that I’ll be asked 
to go through extra screening. It’s more 
the norm than the exception. Usually, 
it happens at Newark or LaGuardia 
[airports]. We’re asked to go into [a] 
special line. 
– Sikh interview respondent
[When traveling in April 2011,] 
I took off my kara [religious steel 
bangle worn by Sikhs]. They said, 
“Can you step aside [and] go 
through additional screening?” I 
asked why they were calling me. 
[The agent] said, “I just need 
to check your headgear.” They 
put me in a glass cage. He got a 
kit. I was standing there for five 
minutes, looking like a fool. They 
asked me to touch my turban. 
After a long time, they finally let 
me go. 
– Sikh interview respondent
Whether as a result of the improper 
use of TSA officer discretion or formalized policies governing addi-
tional searches, community members’ experiences clearly show that 
passengers’ religious attire has played a significant role in whether 
they are subjected to heightened screening.
South Asians Report Their Airport Officials Fail 
to Follow Own Screening Protocol for Passengers 
Wearing Religious Attire
Even more troubling, when questioning did occur, TSA agents often 
failed to follow proper procedures in conducting their inspections. 
Specifically, TSA officers are required to provide the choice of a 
private turban screening or use of a puffer machine, a self pat-down 
and test for chemical traces through a finger swab, or a pat-down 
of the turban from a TSA officer. Among those wearing religious 
or cultural attire, 23% of respondents reported that they were 
told to remove their turban or headscarves during airport security 
screening.  And 30% of these respondents stated that they were not 
given the opportunity to pat-down their own head covering during 
airport security screening.
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[The agents] said that [the turban] was the reason why I went 
through additional screening. They said if I don’t take it off, they 
will search more.
– Sikh interview respondent
The most recent [incident] was at LAX airport in 
April 2011. I was at security for the gate that leads to 
American Airlines and I was returning home to New 
York City [via] JFK airport. I was wearing a turban 
with Western-style clothing, like I always do. A TSA 
agent asked me to step aside for additional screening. She 
searched through all of my bags, unpacking everything. 
I asked her why I was being singled out, and she said it 
was because I was wearing a head covering. She said it 
would be the same if I were wearing a baseball [cap]. I 
told her my turban was religious and that I don’t take 
it off in public. She responded rudely and said “Some 
people call their baseball [cap] a religion.” Then, she 
put on gloves and started grabbing at my turban from 
all angles. It really felt like a violation. She was being 
so rough to [the] point where she almost took my turban 
off. She didn’t tell me I could have done it myself and she 
hardly warned me when she was going to start.
– 26-year-old Sikh female teacher, Crown heights, Brooklyn
Despite the fact that there are procedures on the books that are in-
tended to preserve the privacy and freedom of religion of passengers, 
the narratives of community members show that even these limited 
protections are often not implemented in practice.
South Asians Report Fear of Being Viewed as 
Suspects by the Public 
The impact of such airport profiling, whether occurring at the 
border or when flying within the country, is distressing for com-
munity members. Respondents reported feeling humiliated, viewed 
as suspects by their fellow travelers, and recognizing that they are 
treated differently from other Americans. 
I feel frustrated. The hard thing for me is [that] I travel a lot for 
work. Sometimes you get embarrassed. I get paranoid, make sure 
that I don’t beep. I’m actually kind of used to that, unfortunately. 
– Sikh interview respondent
Every time these incidents occurred, I was alone. I felt very bad and 
tense by all this harassment. I felt like a criminal and there were all 
these other people watching. Sometimes, passengers ask where I’m 
from [and whether] I’ve recently gone back [to Bangladesh] to visit. 
What business do they have to know whether I’ve been back home or 
not? I feel very belittled, because they look at me with suspicion in 
their eyes. Anyone would feel bad. 
– Bangladeshi Muslim taxi driver from Sunnyside, Queens
It absolutely makes you feel hopeless. It’s profiling. It 
makes other people suspicious. We are being pulled 
aside by people in power. This makes other people think 
something is wrong. I try to avoid air travel when 
possible. We’re profiled basically 100% of the time. It 
dehumanizes you – makes you feel like a second-class 
citizen.
– Sikh interview respondent
The most humiliating aspect was being put in a clear glass chamber 
in the middle of the security section [while] waiting for the TSA 
agent. I saw people looking at me as they walked past – no one was 
pulled aside except me. In the minds of most people, even if I saw it 
happen to someone else, I would wonder why the person was pulled 
aside. I would assume there was a reason and, hence, raise my suspi-
cions of the individual.
– 32-year-old male Sikh software manager, JFK Airport
It’s become such a regular occurrence that I don’t think too much 
about it, but therein lays the issue, too. I think right there is a big 
issue because someone shouldn’t have to be screened for what seems to 
be an unnecessary reason.
– Sikh interview respondent
Community members conveyed that such discriminatory screening 
has unfortunately become a new “norm” for them yet they still have 
to grapple with the frustration and stigma that accompanies this 
type of treatment.
South Asians Report Altering Faith-Based 
Behavior When Flying to Avoid Profiling
For some respondents, community members have even changed 
their religious practices when they fly or avoided air travel entirely.
I took off my kara [religious steel bangle worn by Sikhs] to avoid a 
secondary check. It’s not something I like doing but, to avoid being 
profiled, it’s something I do. 
– 32-year-old male Sikh software manager, JFK Airport
After [being subjected to questioning about my personal 
life and my husband after traveling while wearing 
a hijab], the next time [I] traveled, [I] did not wear 
the hijab. [I] was not asked for further screening or 
questioning. [I] was approached very politely. [I] had 
mixed feelings; [I] didn’t know whether to feel happy or 
sad. It felt nice to be treated like everyone else, but, then 
again, it was upsetting to feel [I] was mistreated just 
because [I] wore a hijab. 
– Muslim female interview respondent
I went through a stage where I couldn’t control my anger. So, I 
stopped wearing a turban through the airports for a long time. 
[I] would just wear a hat and take it off when going through. [I] 
calmed down eventually [and] decided [I was] going to wear a tur-
ban again, [but it] kept happening. It has me thinking twice, and I 
shouldn’t have to think twice.
– Sikh interview respondent
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I never grow my dhari [beard] down anymore, and I try to wear 
something underneath, in case I have to remove my bhag [turban]. 
– Sikh interview respondent
The results of such profiling bring into question whether individuals 
are able to fully exercise their First Amendment rights of freedom of 
expression and religion.
Recommendations
Given the nature of the attacks on September 11th and subse-
quent attempted terrorism incidents involving airplanes, there is 
no denying that ensuring airline safety should be of paramount 
concern. however, as the experiences of South Asian community 
members have illustrated, current policies and practices have come 
at the cost of endangering one’s freedom of religion and freedom 
from discrimination as well as compromising individuals’ sense 
of identity – with no demonstrable benefits regarding national 
security. Beyond instituting and bolstering anti-profiling measures, 
as outlined in the “Conclusions and Recommendations” section of 
this report,improved officer training, data collection, and complaint 
processes for community members are needed, specifically by DhS, 
CBP, and TSA. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
[Racial profiling] is wrong, and we will end it in America. 
– President George W. Bush, February 27, 2001lxiii
[N]o law-abiding person, be they an American citizen, a legal immigrant, or a visitor or tourist … should ever be subject to suspicion simply 
because of what they look like. 
– President Barack Obama, May 18, 2010lxiv
In the end, I vote for the Constitution…You just cannot ever take away people’s civil liberties and my heart goes out to anybody who is stopped 
because of the color of their skin or the way they dress, or which temple, mosque or church they come out of… [I]t is so against everything that 
this country was founded on, I don’t know how you could possibly argue to do it.  No, I am very much against racial profiling. 
– New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, June 2, 2002lxv
The public statements of Presidents Bush and Obama and Mayor 
Bloomberg demonstrate that leading decisionmakers in the country 
and New York City recognize the dark cloud of suspicion that has 
been cast on communities of color and that the scourge of racial 
and religious profiling will not be tolerated. Yet, as In Our Own 
Words shows, the actual policies instituted by the government fail to 
meet these promises. Whether it is local law enforcement viewing 
community members with suspicion, or the lingering effects of 
post-September 11th immigration enforcement initiatives, or the 
targeting of community members at the nation’s airports, South 
Asians continue to face discrimination simply because of their actual 
or perceived faiths and backgrounds. 
As illustrated through this documentation project, the effect on 
community members, both personally and collectively, has included 
impermissible inquiries about individuals’ faith and background; 
being viewed as suspects by the broader community; and becoming 
hesitant to reach out to law enforcement for assistance. Perhaps even 
more concerning is that profiling has affected “everyday people” as 
they go about their daily lives and undermined their sense of self-
worth and identity in the process.
At federal, state, and local levels of government, there are indeed 
certain policies on the books that aim to curb the practice of profil-
ing. Policymakers have taken certain steps since September 11th to 
mitigate profiling, such as reducing background-check delays for 
naturalization applications, modifying certain immigration pro-
grams that target community members, and undertaking reviews 
of biased training materials for law enforcement. Yet, government 
agencies often institute such measures only after extensive advocacy 
efforts by community members rather than on their own accord. 
And, often, the procedures are inconsistently followed or are even 
set aside when the specter of national security arises.
In order to eliminate the practice of profiling and its harmful ef-
fects on communities of color, as illustrated by this documentation 
project, members of the Collaborative offer the following detailed 
recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders.
Recommendations for the President
•	 Issue an executive order prohibiting racial profiling by 
federal law enforcement and ban law enforcement practices 
that disproportionately target individuals for investigation and 
enforcement based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or 
religion. The order should also mandate that federal agencies 
collect data on stops and searches that are disaggregated by these 
categories.
•	 Speak out against speech and actions motivated by bias and 
hatred against communities of color. This includes xenophobic 
and racist rhetoric, discrimination, and hate crimes that occur in 
both public and private spheres.
Recommendations for Congress
•	 Pass the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA), which would pro-
hibit the use of profiling on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, 
or national origin by federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies.  This legislation would also require law enforcement 
agencies to conduct anti-profiling trainings, monitor their activi-
ties with respect to race and other protected statuses, and create 
effective complaint resolution processes. In addition, ERPA 
would establish a private right of action for victims of profiling 
that would allow them to seek damages in federal court. 
•	 Hold Congressional hearings and conduct investigations on 
the effect of counterterrorism policies and profiling on South 
Asian, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. This includes hear-
ings specifically on the use of informants and surveillance by the 
FBI and NYPD; profiling in the airport context; and profiling as 
a result of immigration enforcement.
•	 Speak out against speech and actions motivated by bias and 
hatred against communities of color. This includes xenophobic 
and racist rhetoric, discrimination, and hate crimes that occur in 
both public and private spheres.
Recommendations for the U.S. Department 
of Justice
•	 Strengthen and amend the 2003 Guidance Regarding the 
Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement to include national 
origin and religion as bases for prohibiting profiling; remove the 
national security and border integrity loopholes within the guid-
ance; and ensure its application to state and local law enforce-
ment agencies. DOJ should also require all federal, state, and 
local agencies to report on their compliance with the guidance. 
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•	 Commence investigations and file lawsuits against state and 
local law enforcement agencies that engage in racial and re-
ligious profiling under federal civil rights laws. These include 
investigations and litigation under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and “pattern or practice” provisions. Such lawsuits 
and investigations should be instituted for the range of racial and 
religious profiling that have occurred in the post-September 11th 
context.
Recommendations for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation
•	 Release an unredacted version of the Domestic Investigations 
and Operations Guide, particularly the chapters relating to data 
collection of ethnic and religious communities and infiltration of 
places of worship. 
•	 Prohibit infiltration and monitoring of places of worship, 
particularly when there is no information based on reliable and 
individualized evidence of criminal activity occurring at that 
location.
•	 Collect and publish data on the racial, ethnic, and religious 
identity of individuals with whom law enforcement interac-
tions occur. Such efforts should preserve the privacy of commu-
nity members by keeping identifying information of individuals 
confidential.
•	 Undertake comprehensive reviews of existing law enforce-
ment training materials and establish robust review mecha-
nisms for future trainings to ensure that speakers, films, and 
curricula used do not promote stereotypes about South Asian, 
Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities as terrorists.
•	 Reject “radicalization” theories that are based on faulty indica-
tors of criminal or terrorist activity and chill community mem-
bers’ rights to freedom of religion, expression, and assembly.
•	 Separate intelligence-gathering and community outreach 
strategies rather than conflating the two engagement strategies.
•	 Maintain consistent communication with community-based 
organizations to better understand the community impact 
of their protocols and directives and provide opportunities to 
provide input on proposed policies. 
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security
•	 Prohibit immigration-related questioning and federal im-
migration law enforcement by local government agencies 
and sharing of immigration related information with ICE or 
other federal immigration agencies. Local law enforcement 
officers should enforce state and local criminal laws, not federal 
civil immigration laws. Devolving immigration enforcement 
responsibilities, such as through the 287(g) or Secure Communi-
ties programs, to local agencies sends the improper message that 
immigration and crime, or terrorism, are inherently related.
•	 Completely terminate NSEERS/special registration program 
and repeal related regulations. While the program was modi-
fied in April 2011 to “delist” countries whose nationals were re-
quired to register, the underlying regulatory framework remains 
intact. This provides the possibility that a program like NSEERS 
could be resurrected in the future.
•	 Provide immigration relief for those placed into deporta-
tion/removal proceedings as a result of NSEERS and restore 
eligibility for immigration benefits for individuals otherwise 
eligible. Particularly in light of USCIS’ November 2011 policy 
memorandum requiring immigration applications denied due to 
NSEERS violations be referred for NTAs, restoring benefit eligi-
bility is crucial. Individuals who are in removal proceedings as a 
result of NSEERS should also not be barred from consideration 
for prosecutorial discretion by ICE.
•	 Reject the perpetuation of “radicalization” theories that are 
based on faulty indicators of criminal or terrorist activity and 
chill community members’ rights to freedom of religion, expres-
sion, and assembly.
•	 Undertake comprehensive reviews of existing law enforce-
ment training materials and establish robust review mecha-
nisms for future trainings to ensure that speakers, films, and 
curricula used do not promote stereotypes about South Asian, 
Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities as terrorists.
•	 Explicitly and repeatedly state to the public that an individu-
al’s race, ethnicity, or religion should not the basis for suspi-
cious activity reporting programs. Such initiatives include 
DhS’ See Something, Say Something programs. 
•	 Routinely and uniformly train officers and agents on civil 
rights protections afforded to travelers in partnership with 
organizations serving affected community members.
•	 Strengthen complaint processes, such as DHS TRIP, for indi-
viduals affected by profiling. Provide quarterly reports on the 
status of their investigations into complaints and reassess existing 
complaint mechanisms.
Recommendations for U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection
•	 Collect and publish data on the racial, ethnic, and religious 
identity of individuals with whom law enforcement interac-
tions occur. Such efforts should preserve the privacy of commu-
nity members by keeping identifying information of individuals 
confidential.
•	 Audit the use and maintenance of government watchlists that 
can serve as the basis for interrogation at borders and revise the 
mechanism for processing travelers’ complaints.
•	 Remove exceptions to prohibitions based on national security 
and border protection within existing guidance banning profil-
ing and raise the standard for CBP questioning to “probable 
cause.”
•	 Require that agents should only inquire into passengers’ 
religious and political beliefs where there is a substantial nexus 
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between the information obtained through such questioning and 
a specific threat to national security.
•	 Routinely and uniformly train officers and agents on civil 
rights protections afforded to travelers in partnership with 
organizations serving affected community members.
•	 Maintain consistent communication with community-based 
organizations to better understand the community impact 
of their protocols and directives and provide opportunities to 
provide input on proposed policies. 
Recommendations for the Transportation 
Security Administration
•	 Rescind existing policy that mandates individuals wearing 
religious attire, such as turbans and headscarves, be subjected 
to additional secondary screening. 
•	 Revise the “bulky clothing” screening policy to provide 
greater oversight and training  to avoid the misuse of discre-
tion by TSA officers.
•	 Collect and publish data on the racial, ethnic, and religious 
identity of individuals with whom law enforcement interac-
tions occur. Such efforts should preserve the privacy of commu-
nity members by keeping identifying information of individuals 
confidential.
•	 Maintain consistent communication with community-based 
organizations to better understand the community impact 
of their protocols and directives and provide opportunities to 
provide input on proposed policies. 
Recommendations for the New York 
Governor’s Office
•	 Issue an executive order prohibiting profiling and ban law en-
forcement practices that disproportionately target individuals for 
investigation and enforcement based on race, ethnicity, national 
origin, gender, or religion. These orders should also mandate 
that government agencies collect data on stops and searches that 
are disaggregated by these categories. These orders should also 
explicitly apply in the contexts of travel, surveillance, and im-
migration enforcement.
Recommendations for New York State Assembly
•	 Introduce and pass robust state-level anti-profiling legisla-
tion, including those modeled after the End Racial Profiling Act, 
which would prohibit the use of profiling on the basis of race, 
religion, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender 
by law enforcement agencies; require law enforcement agencies 
to conduct anti-profiling trainings, monitor their activities with 
respect race and other protected statuses, and create effective 
complaint resolution processes; and establish a private right of 
action for victims of profiling that would allow them to seek 
damages in court.
•	 Hold state legislative hearings and conduct investigations on 
the effect of counterterrorism policies and profiling on South 
Asian, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. This includes hear-
ings specifically on the use of informants and surveillance by the 
FBI and NYPD. 
•	 Pass state legislation that explicitly prohibits surveillance 
premised on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion by law 
enforcement agencies.
•	 Strengthen government and civilian oversight over state and 
local law enforcement agencies, including the NYPD.
•	 Prohibit state and local law enforcement from inquiring 
about individuals’ immigration status or otherwise carry out 
immigration laws. This includes the effects of federal programs, 
such as Secure Communities and 287(g), as well as similar poli-
cies instituted by state and local lawmakers.
Recommendations for New York City 
Mayor’s Office
•	 Issue an executive order prohibiting profiling and ban law 
enforcement practices that disproportionately target individuals 
for investigation and enforcement based on race, ethnicity, na-
tional origin, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. These orders 
should also mandate that government agencies collect data on 
stops and searches that are disaggregated by these categories. 
These orders should also explicitly apply in the contexts of travel, 
surveillance, and immigration enforcement.
•	 Explicitly and repeatedly state to the public that an individu-
al’s race, ethnicity, or religion should not the basis for suspi-
cious activity reporting programs. Such initiatives include 
MTA’s See Something, Say Something program. 
Recommendations for New York City Council
•	 Introduce and pass robust city-level anti-profiling legislation, 
including policies which would prohibit the use of profiling on 
the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, sexual gen-
der, immigration status, or housing status by law enforcement 
agencies; require law enforcement agencies to conduct anti-
profiling trainings, monitor their activities with respect race and 
other protected statuses, and create effective complaint resolu-
tion processes; and establish a private right of action for victims 
of profiling that would allow them to seek damages in court.
•	 Introduce and pass legislation that protects individuals’ 
rights during interactions with law enforcement, including 
requiring officers to inform individuals regarding the right to 
refuse consent for a search when police do not have a warrant or 
probable cause; and requiring officers to provide business cards 
with their name, rank, and Civilian Complaint Review Board 
contact information, following each stop and frisk encounter. 
•	 Hold council hearings and conduct investigations on the 
effect of counterterrorism policies and profiling on South 
Asian, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. This includes New 
York City Council hearings specifically on the use of informants 
and surveillance by the FBI and NYPD. 
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•	 Pass city-wide legislation that explicitly prohibits surveil-
lance premised on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion by 
local law enforcement agencies.
•	 Strengthen government and civilian oversight over local law 
enforcement agencies, including the NYPD. Specifically, the 
New York City Council should create a new Inspector General’s 
office to oversee the NYPD.
•	 Prohibit state and local law enforcement from inquiring 
about individuals’ immigration status or otherwise carry out 
immigration laws. This includes the effects of federal programs, 
such as Secure Communities and 287(g), as well as similar poli-
cies instituted by state and local lawmakers.
•	 Develop strategies in tandem with administrative agen-
cies to reduce over-policing and profiling in public schools. 
Specifically, the City Council should work with the New York 
City Department of Education to reduce the number of School 
Safety Agents and armed NYPD officers stationed in local public 
schools; ensure that the NYPD meets requirement of reporting 
arrests in schools as per the Student Safety Act; end all stop and 
frisk activities targeting youth of color; and require the use of 
and provide funding for Positive Behavior Interventions Support 
(PBIS) programs for schools to address most discipline issues, 
including bullying and harassment. 
•	 Speak out against speech and actions motivated by bias and 
hatred against communities of color. This includes xenophobic 
and racist rhetoric, discrimination, and hate crimes that occur in 
both public and private spheres.
Recommendations for New York City Police 
Department
• Strengthen and implement existing anti-profiling policies. 
Specifically, existing anti-profiling policies, such as New York 
City’s 2004 policy, should be enforced; and the NYPD should 
enforce and explicitly prohibit profiling on the basis of religion 
under Operations Order 11. 
•	 Reject the perpetuation of “radicalization” theories that are 
based on faulty indicators of criminal or terrorist activity and 
chill community members’ rights to freedom of religion, expres-
sion, and assembly.
•	 Undertake comprehensive reviews of existing law enforce-
ment training materials and establish robust review mecha-
nisms for future trainings to ensure that speakers, films, and 
curricula used do not promote stereotypes about South Asian, 
Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities as terrorists.
•	 Separate intelligence-gathering and community outreach 
strategies rather than conflating the two engagement strategies.
•	 Explicitly and repeatedly state to the public that an indi-
vidual’s race, ethnicity, or religion should not the basis for 
suspicious activity reporting programs. 
•	 Collect and publish data on the racial, ethnic, and religious 
identity of individuals with whom law enforcement interac-
tions occur. Such efforts should preserve the privacy of commu-
nity members by keeping identifying information of individuals 
confidential.
•	 Prohibit immigration-related questioning, immigration law 
enforcement, and sharing of immigration-related informa-
tion by local government agencies with federal immigra-
tion agencies. Local and state law enforcement officers should 
enforce state and local criminal laws not federal civil immigra-
tion laws. Devolving immigration enforcement responsibilities, 
such as through the 287(g) or Secure Communities programs, to 
local agencies sends the improper message that immigration and 
crime, or terrorism, are inherently related.
•	 Mandate religious and cultural competency trainings on 
South Asian, Muslim, and Sikh communities for all officers and 
personnel. This includes proactively reaching out to community-
based organizations with expertise on these communities for 
such trainings.
Recommendations for South Asian Community 
Leaders and Concerned Community Members
•	 Report incidents of profiling to community-based organiza-
tions committed to eliminating profiling and through govern-
ment complaint mechanisms.
•	 Host “know your rights” trainings and disseminate “know 
your rights” brochures to constituents on a regular basis.
•	 Write letters to the editor or op-eds in media outlets that have 
previously covered stories on profiling.
•	 Build relationships and stand in solidarity with other com-
munities of color affected by profiling, including the African-
American and Latino communities.
Recommendations for Philanthropic Institutions
•	 Build capacity within South Asian communities to engage 
in community organizing, advocacy, and direct assistance to 
individuals affected by profiling. In order for communities to 
address the systemic nature of profiling with policymakers and 
to provide educational resources to law enforcement agencies, 
increased funding support is needed.
•	 Support future documentation efforts and statistical analysis 
of the evolving nature of profiling affecting South Asian com-
munities. As more reports of profiling emerge and the nature of 
practice has changed, increase support is needed to capture the 
impact on community members.
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A P P E N D I X  A :  D E S C R I P T I O N S  O F  N E W  Y O R K  C I T Y 
P R O F I L I N G  C O L L A B O R A T I V E  O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
The following organizations were a part of the New York City Profiling Collaborative to document the community’s experiences as it relates 
to racial and religious profiling in the post-September 11th world. All organizations belong to the National Coalition of South Asian 
Organizations (NCSO), a network of 41 organizations across the country that are rooted in social justice values and empower South Asian 
communities through social service provision, organizing, advocacy, and community education.
Coney Island Avenue Project
1117 Coney Island Avenue, Suite 1R 
Brooklyn, NY 11230 
Phone: 718-859-0238
www.ciapnyc.org
Coney Island Avenue Project (CIAP) was formed in November 
2001 to advocate on behalf of the South Asian and Muslim com-
munities who have suffered from the anti-immigrant backlash in the 
wake of September 11th. CIAP offers particular support to immi-
grant detainees and their families. The mission of CIAP is to combat 
racism and promote empowerment of working class South Asians 
through: legislative change, legal advocacy, and community-based 
education. CIAP’s social justice vision is to help build a society 
where working-class South Asians are treated with equality, toler-
ance, and respect. CIAP is a member of the NCSO.
Council of Peoples Organization




Council of Peoples Organization’s (COPO) mission is to assist low-
income immigrant families, particularly South Asians and Muslims, 
to reach their full potential as residents of New York City. COPO 
empowers marginalized communities to advocate for their rights 
and understand their responsibilities as Americans. COPO helps to 
build community relations among Muslim and non-Muslim com-
munity groups. COPO is working to establish connections between 
the communities and various government agencies. COPO is a 
member of the NCSO.
Desis Rising Up and Moving
72-18 Roosevelt Avenue
Jackson heights, NY 11372 
Phone: (718) 205-3036
www.drumnyc.org 
DRUM - Desis Rising Up and Moving is a multigenerational, 
membership-led organization of over 1,400 low-income South 
Asian immigrant workers and youth in New York City. For 12 years, 
DRUM has built the leadership of thousands of South Asian low-
wage immigrant workers, families fighting deportation and profiling 
as Muslims/South Asians, and youth to change policies that impact 
their lives.  DRUM was on the ground before and since 9/11 orga-
nizing and providing services to thousands of detainees and people 
facing deportation.  DRUM’s model consists of base building, 
leadership development, policy change campaigns, membership ser-
vices, and movement building.  The organization particularly builds 
leaders from the most marginalized in our community- low-income 
workers and youth, undocumented immigrants, and women, to win 
full civil, human, and economic rights. DRUM is a member of the 
NCSO.
The Sikh Coalition 
40 Exchange Place, Suite 728
New York, NY 10005 
www.sikhcoalition.org
The Sikh Coalition is a community-based organization that works 
towards the realization of civil and human rights for all people. In 
particular, The Sikh Coalition works towards a world where Sikhs 
may freely practice and enjoy their faith while fostering strong 
relations with their local community wherever they may be. The 
organization pursues its mission by: providing direct legal services 
to persons whose civil or human rights are violated; advocating for 
law and policies that are respectful of fundamental rights; promot-
ing appreciation for diversity through education; and fostering civic 
engagement in order to promote local community empowerment. 
With a full-time staff of 12 and offices in New York City, Fremont, 
CA and Washington D.C., The Sikh Coalition is the most-staffed 
Sikh organization in the history of the United States. The Sikh 
Coalition is a member of the NCSO.
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South Asian Youth Action (SAYA!)
54-05 Seabury Street
Elmhurst, NY 11373
Phone: (718) 651-3484 
www.saya.org
South Asian Youth Action (SAYA!) provides comprehensive youth 
development programs for low-income South Asian youth in New 
York City. Through academic, leadership, sports, arts, and counsel-
ing programs, SAYA! presents youth with the possibility to expand 
their horizons and realize their dreams. In the organization’s 15 
year history, SAYA! has opened the door to over 7,700 youth who 
are often the first in their families to attend high school and pursue 
college in the U.S. SAYA! currently offers programs at the organiza-
tion’s center in Elmhurst, Queens and at multiple public schools. 
SAYA! is a member of the NCSO.
UNITED SIKHS
JAF, POB 7203
New York, NY 10116
Phone: (646) 688-3525
www.unitedsikhs.org
UNITED SIKhS is a U.N.-affiliated, international non-profit, 
non-governmental, humanitarian relief, human development and 
advocacy organization, aimed at empowering those in need, espe-
cially disadvantaged and minority communities across the world. 
The mission of the organization is to transform underprivileged and 
minority communities and individuals into informed and vibrant 
members of society through civic, educational and personal devel-
opment programs, by fostering active participation in social and 
economic activity. UNITED SIKhS began in 1999 when a group 
of Sikhs from the New York metropolitan area banded together to 
assist in the socio-economic development of immigrant communi-
ties in Queens, New York. UNITED SIKhS is a member of the 
NCSO.
South Asian Americans Leading Together
6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 506
Takoma Park, MD 20912
Phone: (301) 270-1855
www.saalt.org
South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT) is a national 
nonpartisan non-profit organization that elevates the voices and 
perspectives of South Asian individuals and organizations to build a 
more just and inclusive society in the United States. SAALT’s strate-
gies include conducting public policy analysis and advocacy; build-
ing partnerships with South Asian organizations and allies; mobiliz-
ing communities to take action; and developing leadership for social 
change. SAALT is the coordinating entity for the NCSO.
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A P P E N D I X  C :  D E M O G R A P h I C
O V E R V I E W  O F  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E 
R E S P O N D E N T S
Gender     Men    59%
     Women    37%
     Other/No response  4%  
  
Religion     Islam    39%
     Sikhism    37%
     hinduism   5%
     Other/No response  19%
Ethnicity/National Origin   Indian    28%
(Self-identified)    Pakistani    20%
     Bangladeshi   13%
     Other/No response  40%
Age     Under 13   2%
     13-17 years   21%
     18-25 years   24%
     26-34 years   15%
     35-44 years   15%
     45-54 years   14%
     55-65 years   5%
     Over 65 years   2%
     No response   2%
Employment Sector   Retail/sales
(Top 5 Responses)    Construction
     Transportation
     Food service
     Medical
  
Languages Spoken at Home  English 
(Top 5 Responses)    Punjabi
     Urdu
     hindi
     Bengali
Place of Residence   Queens    61%
     Brooklyn   24%
     Manhattan   4%
     Long Island   2%
     Other/No response  8%
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The New York City Profiling Collaborative expresses deep and sincere gratitude to all the community members who participated in this 
project and courageously shared their stories and experiences with us. 
The Collaborative thanks the current and former staff, consultants, and interns who were instrumental in the development and implemen-
tation of this documentation project, including Bobby Khan, Nabila Khan, and Sid Mehta of Coney Island Avenue Project (CIAP); Moe 
Razvi and hasiba Rashid of Council of Peoples Organization (COPO); Monami Maulik, Suzanne Adely, Fahd Ahmed, Ayesha Mahmooda, 
and Roksana Mun of DRUM - Desis Rising Up and Moving; Amardeep Singh, Tejpreet Kaur, Gurwinder Singh, and Pavita Singh of The 
Sikh Coalition; hena Ashraf of South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT); Udai Tambar and Arshiah Khan at South Asian Youth 
Action (SAYA!); and Rucha Kavathe, Ilana Ofgang, hansdeep Singh, Jaspreet Singh, and Manmeet Singh at UNITED SIKhS. 
The Collaborative also appreciates the advocates who shared their time and expertise in providing insights in the development of the report 
and its recommendations, including Amna Akbar of the City University of New York Law School; Udi Ofer of the New York Civil Liberties 
Union (NYCLU); Faiza Patel of the Brennan Center for Justice; Rahul Saksena; and Susan Shah of the Vera Institute of Justice.
The Collaborative also appreciates the expertise and training in participatory community research provided by the Urban Justice Center. 
The primary author of this report was Priya Murthy of SAALT, with editing support from Deepa Iyer and Nasreen hosein of SAALT, and 
Tushar Sheth. 
This documentation project and report were made possible through the support of the Proteus Fund’s Security and Rights Collaborative.
Graphic design and layout by Ari Evergreen of Shirari Industries.
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Front cover: (Clockwise from left) DRUM leader Shahina Parvin at an April 2011 anti-war march in New York City while holding a photo 
of her son, Shahawar Matin Siraj (Credit: DRUM); Sikh community member in New York City (Credit: The Sikh Coalition); DRUM 
YouthPower member in New York City (Credit: DRUM); harun Ur Rasheed, bidding goodbye to supporters and loved ones at JFK Air-
port before returning to Bangladesh as a result of NSEERS (Credit: Families for Freedom; courtesy: Subhash Kateel). Page 7: (Clockwise 
from top left) Menu at a restaurant in Jackson heights, Queens; local mosaic decorating a grocery store in Jackson heights, Queens; store-
fronts in Jackson heights, Queens (Credit: hena Ashraf ); Page 13: Makki Masjid on Coney Island Avenue in Brooklyn, New York, which 
has a significant Pakistani congregation, with an NYPD patrol car in front.  (Credit: hena Ashraf ). Page 14: March 22, 2011 Muslim 
American Civil Liberties Coalition Press Conference Calling for police accountability regarding CIA & NYPD activities with immigrant 
rights organizations, Muslim community members, leaders advocates and elected officials; DRUM Members: Shamsun Nahar, Shahina 
Parvin Siraj,  Abu Chowdhury, and Kazi Fouzia (Credit: DRUM). Page 17: YouthPower members of DRUM marching in the India Day 
Parade in New York City in 2002 carrying a banner for the Stop the Disappearances Campaign, which included Desis Rising Up and Mov-
ing and the Immigrant Justice Solidarity Project, and the Prison Moratorium Project, to release September 11th detainees and end mass 
arrests. (Credit: DRUM). Page 18: DRUM leader Moni Alam, wife of a special registrant who was deported, leading chants at the Queens 
Drivers License rally in 2005; Moni subsequently founded DRUM’s sister organization after having to leave the U.S. with her husband 
and kids in Canada named the South Asian Women’s human Rights Organization. (Credit: DRUM). Page 20: (Clockwise from top left) 
Image obtained at http://www.pravasitoday.com/sikh-coalition-leads-call-for-probing-racial-profiling-in-us; Image obtained at http://www.
topnews.in/usa/sikhs-should-expect-screening-turbans-us-airports-26851; Community member holding anti-profiling sign (Credit: The 
Sikh Coalition).
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i “highlights of AP’s probe into NYPD intelligence operations,” Associated Press. Available at http://www.ap.org/nypd/. 
ii For a list and descriptions of Collaborative member organizations, see Appendix A.
iii City of New York Executive Order No. 41, “City-wide Privacy Policy and Amendment of Executive Order No. 34 Relation to City Policy 
Concerning Immigrant Access to City Services.” (September 17, 2003). Available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/eo-41.pdf.
iv U.S. Census Bureau 2010 Census. Summary File 1, Tables PCT5, PCT6, and PCT 7. These figures represent population “race alone” to-
tals for Asian Indian, Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, Nepalese, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan responses for the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, 
and Staten Island. It may not include figures South Asians who belong to the diaspora (e.g. Indo-Caribbeans), due to how the Census 
Bureau categories such responses.
v Census forms ask individuals to self-report their race/ethnicity. The only South Asian-specific option printed on the Census 2010 form 
that individuals could check off for the race/ethnicity was “Asian Indian.” Individuals from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and the diaspora found that their specific ethnicity was not specifically delineated on the form. Non-Indian South Asians had to choose 
between “Asian Indian” or writing in another ethnicity under the “Other Asian” category. Yet, many non-Indian South Asians may have 
automatically checked off “Asian Indian” upon seeing it as the only South Asian option printed on the form, leading to a likely overcount of 
the Indian population and undercount of other South Asian populations.
vi U.S. Census Bureau 2010 Census. Summary File 1, Tables PCT5, PCT6, and PCT 7.
vii Id.
viii Id.
ix To view a full copy of the English version of the questionnaire, see Appendix B. Translated versions of questionnaires are on file with the 
Collaborative organizations.
x Indeed, many community members approached by the Collaborative organizations to complete the questionnaire expressed hesitancy in 
participating out of fear only sharing personal information about their experiences, potentially underscoring the degree to which commu-
nity members have become afraid to convey their stories to anyone, even advocacy organizations that guaranteed that any and all responses 
would remain confidential.
xi See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona, Driving While Black or Brown: An Analysis of Racial Profiling in Arizona (April 2008). 
Available at www.acluaz.org/DrivingWhileBlackorBrown.pdf.
xii See generally, Lamberth Consulting, “Racial Profiling Doesn’t Work.” Available at www.lamberthconsulting.com/about-racial-profiling/
racial-profiling-doesnt-work.asp.
xiii Id.
xiv See, e.g. Madison Police Department Detective Alix Olson, “American law enforcement must demand the removal of Sheriff Arpaio from 
duty” (January 14, 2010). Available at www.huffingtonpost.com/alix-olson/american-law-enforcement_b_423527.html.
xv See generally, Rights Working Group and American Civil Liberties Union, The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: 
A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2009). Available at www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/human-
rights/cerd_finalreport.pdf.
xvi Immigration Policy Center, “Targets of Suspicion: The Impact of Post-9/11 Policies on Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in the United 
States,” (hereinafter “IPC Report”) Immigration Policy In Focus, Vol.3, Issue 2 (May 2004). Available at www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/Targets%20of%20Suspicion.pdf. See also “Letter from South Asian Women’s Organizations to White house Council 
on Women and Girls and White house Advisor on Violence Against Women” (November 2, 2009). Available at http://saalt.org/attach-
ments/1/Letter%20from%20South%20Asian%20Organizations%20on%20Violence%20against%20Women%20Issues.pdf.
xvii Tara Barahmpour, “Some Muslims, fearing backlash, worry about intent of Census,” The Washington Post (March 20, 2010). Available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/09/AR2010030901688.html
xviii South Asian Americans Leading Together, From Macacas to Turban Toppers: The Rise in Racist and Xenophobic Rhetoric in Political Dis-
course (October 2010). Available at http://saalt.org/attachments/1/From%20Macacas%20to%20Turban%20Toppers%20Report.small.pdf.
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xx See generally, National Coalition of South Asian Organizations, A National Action Agenda: Policy Recommendations to Empower South 
Asian Communities – Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Section (July 2008). Available at www.saalt.org/attachments/1/Civil%20Rights%20
and%20Civil%20Liberties.pdf.
xxi See e.g. Sharon Cohen, “Arab Americans Complain of Profiling” (Case of Ashraf Khan flying to Pakistan), Associated Press (September 25, 
2001). Linda Gibson, “Uneasy pilots refuse Arab-named travelers” (Cases of Akbar Ali and Muhammad Naeem from Pakistan), St. Peters-
burg Times (September 22, 2001). Available at www.sptimes.com/News/092201/hillsborough/Uneasy_pilots_refuse_.shtml (Last accessed 
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